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ABSTRACT

The Great American Riddle: Ulysses S. Grant and Civil Rights
Thesis (December 2015)

Christopher Richard Castillo, B. A., Texas A&M International University;

Co-Chairs of Committee: Dr. Deborah L. Blackwell & Dr. Mark A. Menaldo

The prevailing scholarship on Ulysses S. Grant and Reconstruction was established by
authors who wrote on the subjects in the aftermath of Reconstruction. Scholars of the “Lost
Cause,” include the likes of John Burgess and William Dunning and many pupils. The arguments
set forth by these writers and scholars created the notions that Grant was a butcher general during
the Civil War who sent thousands of Union soldiers to needlessly die during his military
campaigns, and that he was one of the nation’s worst presidents. Furthermore, they have argued
that Grant was intellectually incompentent, corrupt, and unable to handle the political aspects of
the Civil War and Reconstruction. These arguments have created a social construction of the past
that has dominated American thinking on Grant, and have been carried on by modern scholars in
the field.
Because Grant rarely shared his views, publicly or privately, he did not leave behind the
large volumes of historical evidence one expects from esteemed generals and former presidents.
Since he was silent on most issues, extensive analysis of what is available is required. Most
historical scholars have not been able, or willing, to remove themselves from established
writings on Grant and have failed to fully analyze the historical sources left by the general,
leading to sweeping generalizations about his views an character.

iv
This thesis seeks to challenge the established historiography on Grant by arguing the he was
more than capable of comprehending the political and military aspects of the Civil War and
Reconstruction. Grant demonstrated this, as he progrssed from fighting for the Union first, to
accepting and protecting emancipation and black civil rights. Moreover, as both Commanding
General of the United States Army and President, Grant was willing to expand his use of the U.S.
Army as the proper means of upholding cvil equality for free blacks and protecting the Union
from further violence. It is necessary to understand the complex, yet evolutionary nature of
Grant, as doing so will lead to a more nuanced understanding of how his policies aided in
transforming American society.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The historical scholarship on Ulysses S. Grant that began in the late 19th century and in
the early 20th century has held one dominant view of Grant. He has been portrayed as either a
brilliant general and a corrupt failed politician, or a drunk and one of our worst presidents.
Despite the revisionism in the 1960s that attempted to reverse such scholarship on
Reconstruction, most historians have failed to challenge the consensual view on Grant. More
recent scholarship on Grant has attempted to restore his reputation, but have only done so by
arguing on his views or policies enacted during Reconstruction. While this scholarship is
certainly welcomed, it still contains the same arguments found in the scholarship of Grant’s
detractors. Through the historiography presented, a problem within the scholarship on Grant and
Reconstruction has been revealed that goes beyond how the general is depicted. The issue is a
form of social construction of the past and it continues to influence scholars decades after the
scholarship has been written. Recent work on Grant, such as William McFeely’s Grant, have
attempted to capture the personality of the man.
But they do so under the influence of outdated views of Grant established by the likes of
William A. Dunning and other writers of the Lost Cause.1 Dunning, who wrote on
Reconstruction at the turn of the 20th century, firmly established the era and the members
Republican Party, including Grant, as failures. Not only were such works written by historians
who let their racial biases permeate their work during the Jim Crow era, but they failed provide
scholarly and coherent accounts on Grant and Reconstruction. Furthermore, their mainstay on

Brooks D. Simpson, “Butcher? Racist? An Examination of William S. McFeely’s Grant: A Biography.”
Civil War History 33, no. 1 (1987): 64-65, accessed November 11, 2015, http://muse.jhu.edu/.; Eric Foner,
Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York, 1988), xvii-xix.
1
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American in the subjects thinking has influenced writings on the subject since. Because Grant
wrote little on most issues during his lifetime, and as a result left little historical evidence, any
attempt to write on him requires a deep analysis of what is available. Since historical scholars
have failed to remove themselves from established writings on Grant, they have made sweeping
generalizations when writing on him. While revisionist historians, such as Martin E. Mantell and
Brooks D. Simpson, have challenged this approach to Reconstruction, more scholarship on Grant
is required. Because represents a historical enigma, Grant requires careful analysis, and it must
be accepted that he was not one to write or speak intensively on his views.
In order to argue against the prevailing view that Grant was inept and one dimensional, it
is necessary to understand Grant as an individual as he represents a puzzle. This will allow for
better understanding of Grant as he transitioned from fighting for the Union first to accepting and
willing to protect emancipation and black civil rights. Grant was able to do this through the
course of the Civil War and into his presidency, and he was willing to expand his use of the U.S.
Army to do so. With the Union as his central moral principle, Grant, as both commanding
general of the United States Army and as the President, was willing to adopt any measure
necessary to uphold the Union, including protecting civil equality for free blacks. As a result,
Grant, as Mantell argues, played an active role in policymaking concerning emancipation and
civil rights.2 Further examination of Grant has revealed that Grant adopted a policy of military
enforcement as unrest continued in the South. This not only represents Grant’s understanding of
the political nature of the war and Reconstruction, but was a radical use of presidential power as
the scope of the Federal government continued to expand under the Republicans after the Civil

2

Martin E. Mantell, Johnson, Grant, & the Politics of Reconstruction (New York & London, 1973), 3-4.;
Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861-1868
(Chapel Hill & London, 1991), xv-xvii.
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War. It is necessary to understand the complex, evolutionary nature of Grant as it will lead to a
better understanding of his policies that transformed American society.
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CHAPTER II
SCHOLARSHIP ON ULYSSES S. GRANT AND RECONSTRUCTION
As the war drew to a close, the country was forced to determine how decades of sectional
dispute could be reconciled into national harmony. While trying to embrace reconciliation, the
country faced a social revolution. Because the war was fought amongst fellow countrymen on
soil inhabited by the same people, both sides had to live under the same government and its new
laws. In essence, the country faced the harrowing task of dispersing sectional tension and
asserting a wartime victory, which included establishing full rights for emancipated slaves.
While the South accepted defeat on the battlefield its notions of white supremacy in many ways
grew stronger as Southerners faced the reality of former slaves exercising rights previously
reserved for the white population. In order to maintain a Southern identity, writers, defeated
planters, laborers competing with free blacks for work, and journalists created a view of history
that ensured the antebellum life was not forgotten. This view of history, or “history as
propaganda” as W.E.B. Du Bois called it, has been established as a longstanding understanding
of Civil War memory.3 More importantly, the struggle over Civil War memory shaped the
narrative of Reconstruction and the historical agency of the individuals who participated in it,
including Ulysses S. Grant. The North may have been victorious on the battlefield, but it was the
South which stood victorious as Reconstruction ended and the scholarship of the era dominated
American social and political thinking for decades.
Due to the devastation of the war, much of the South lay in ruins in 1865. Richmond was
reduced to smoldering ruins, the Shenandoah Valley a waste, and Georgia and the Carolinas
wounded by General William T. Sherman’s March to the Sea. Most of the South’s major cities

3

W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880 (New York, 1992), 4-8.

11
lay in ruin and vast areas of Southern landscape were depopulated as many Southerners found
themselves refugees. For many white Southerners, defeat represented a deep and profound loss
as many were witness to the destruction that consumed their plantations. In addition to the loss of
their homes, Southerners had to come to terms with their labor force being transformed from
slave labor to free labor. Still, like Grant, many Northerners believed sectional reconciliation was
the best means to secure national harmony. While on his world tour in 1877, Grant reflected on
the feeling of reconciliation to John Russell Young of the New York Herald in Young’s Around
the World with General Grant. On the subject of Reconstruction, Grant maintained that after the
war “there has never been a moment since Lee surrendered that [Grant] would not have gone
more than halfway to meet the Southern people in a spirit of conciliation.”4 The problem with
pushing for reconciliation, however, centered on the Republicans in Congress and their push for
a policy that was a combination of retribution and a desire to make the Constitution include black
political and economic equality. Congressional Republicans believed Reconstruction was to be a
speedy process and imagined a South that could not control national politics as it had done in the
years prior to the Civil War. This speedy process was rooted in forgiveness and reconciliation,
but on the terms of the Republicans, and that meant the acceptance of black equality.5 Grant
firmly believed in offering conciliation, but like many Northerners, blamed the South for
refusing to meet the terms offered by the North. In 1877, Grant argued “The pacification of the
South rests entirely with the South. I do not know what the North can do that has not been done,
unless [the North surrenders] the result of the war.”6 Grant continued to Russell, “I think
Republicans should go as far as possible in conciliation, but not far enough to lose self-respect.”7

4
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It was clear to many Northerners, reconciliation between the two sections was desired, but on the
terms of the victor.
With Radical Republicans in control, equality before the law was the policy of
Reconstruction, and of course, this presented a problem to both Southerners and Northerners
satisfied with the antebellum economic and social order. Still, the Radicals quickly went to work
once President Johnson no longer presented a threat to their political agenda. Congress sought to
establish black suffrage through the expansion of citizenship, the right to vote, and military rule
over the South to ensure federal law could not be threatened. For the Radicals, healing and
forgiveness could begin once the South accepted these measures. Thaddeus Stevens, a prominent
champion of black suffrage, declared, “in rebuilding, it is necessary to clear away the rotten and
defective portions of the old foundations, and to sink deep and found the repaired edifice upon
the firm foundation of eternal justice.”8 For many Southerners, the image of freedmen exercising
political agency stirred sentiments of oppression at the hands of the Radicals, and not feelings of
reconciliation.9
It is in within this struggle over national identity that the scholarship on Reconstruction
began. In most instances, this occurred immediately after hostilities ceased. Traveling poets and
writers from the North, such as John R. Denett. John T. Trowbridge who published The South: A
Tour of its Battlefields and Ruined Cities (1866), allowed Northern readers to learn about the
devastation and political conditions of the South. The Richmond Dispatch resumed publication
on December 9, 1865 after its facilities were destroyed in a fire during the fall of the city, and
used its first editorial to declare an early form of the Lost Cause ideology. The Dispatch
championed the effort of the South during the war and declared the South was defeated due to

8
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the numerical superiority held by the North. This notion of Southern bravery and defeat at the
hands of superior numbers allowed Southerners to create a collective identity based on the notion
that the South, while defeated, could rise again and restore the antebellum life. Race and
suffering under a government run by the Radical Republicans were necessary evils the South
must endure in order to fully realize a new Southern identity.10
Edward A. Pollard used this notion of the South “rising up” when he published The Lost
Cause in 1866. Following this manifesto, Pollard wrote The Lost Cause Regained (1868). The
Lost Cause Regained examines the state of the South during Reconstruction up to the year 1868.
Not surprisingly, Pollard uses The Lost Cause Regained to attack all aspects of Reconstruction
and the Republican Party. Present in Pollard’s work is a complete hatred for the Radical wing of
the Republican Party and full blame for Reconstruction. He presents President Andrew Johnson
in a more positive light and declares his term as a “comparatively happy time for the country.”11
To Pollard, it was the Republicans who created a revolutionary movement and consolidated the
government without Southern representatives in Congress. By doing this, Pollard argues, the
Republicans rejected the relationship between the states and the federal government and
proceeded to create a new government. While Pollard presents an argument centered on the
relationship between the states and the federal government and the constitutionality of the
expansion of federal power, this is only a device meant to thinly mask his true intentions with the
book.12
Pollard is referring to the laws on civil rights for emancipated slaves. Racial tension is at
the heart of The Lost Cause Regained as the book is essentially a propaganda tool meant to
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further enrage the white population. An entire chapter of the book is dedicated to defining the
“scientific and religious” inferiority of slaves. It is this notion of inferiority that Pollard claims is
the “true and only defence of slavery.”13 Granting emancipated slaves the right to vote “would
involve him in a competition with the white man…and be a direct invitation to what [freedmen
have] to fear the most—a war of races.”14 Any Southerner conflicted with their identity and not
being able to accept former slaves becoming equal no doubt understood Pollard’s words and this
may have contributed to the already rampant violence present in the South in 1868.
Enraging already defeated Southerners may have been Pollard’s goal with the Lost Cause
Regained. Pollard does not outright issue a call to arms to Southerners for he believes the cause
has taken a new phase, one that does not require violence. For Pollard, the Cause will never be
lost because of the strong power of public opinion within society. Indeed, Pollard is correct in
arguing public opinion is strong in America when compared to other countries as the First
Amendment protects this.15 It appeared to Pollard that the only method in which Southerners can
retain their identity is in the arena of public opinion.
Ulysses S. Grant is relatively absent from the book, as are most Northerners who played a
prominent role during Reconstruction. Pollard refers to Grant’s role during Reconstruction as a
dictatorship. Of course, Pollard does not provide an argument on why the South lived under
Grant’s supposed “dictatorship.” Perhaps, however, Pollard may be referring to Grant being in
command of the Army that occupied the Southern states undergoing Reconstruction in 1868, the
year the book was published. In his lengthy tirade against Congress, Pollard asserts that the
Radicals suffocated the South with military rule and were able to “drug” Grant as a means to get
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him to follow their agenda. Again, Pollard does not provide any sort of reasoning for this claim.
As per Pollard’s reasoning, Reconstruction was an event that forced white Southerners to live
under inequality and forcibly accept emancipation pushed by two parties, the “abolitionists” and
the “negrophilists.” Any other individual not labeled as such, like Grant, was simply inactive or
purposefully fooled to follow these two parties. By removing Grant as an active agent during
Reconstruction in his highly influential book, Pollard may have viewed the general’s role as
either passive, or rather insignificant.16
The Lost Cause ideology championed by the likes of Pollard spread throughout the South
and was rooted in at least three elements: white supremacy, the control of history, and the use of
women as mother-like protectors of Southern manhood. By the late 1880s, diehard champions of
the Confederacy began to shape Confederate memory. For example, they elevated Robert E. Lee
to a god-like figure who was only defeated due to the Grant’s superior numbers. The argument
was made that only with superior numbers was Grant able to defeat Lee in 1864-1865, especially
as Lee found success against other Union commanders. By creating this argument, Lost Cause
supporters minimized Grant’s victory over Lee. Grant was not particularly fond of Lee’s mythic
aura, he admitted to be more wary of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston. This was
especially true as Lee’s grand reputation was on display as Grant toured Europe, predominantly
in England. Grant remarked to Young, “The cry was in the air that the North only won by brute
force; that the generalship and valor were with the South. This has gone into history, with so
many other illusions that are historical.” Of Lee, Grant remarked, “Lee was of a slow,
conservative, cautious nature, without imagination or humor, always the same, with grave
dignity. I never could see in his achievements what justifies his reputation. The illusion that
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nothing but heavy odds beat him will not stand the ultimate light of history.”17Grant was further
annoyed by the depiction of Union soldiers in English newspapers. While visiting Hong Kong
during his 1877 tour, Grant revealed his frustrations to Young as he read in English newspapers
articles describing atrocities committed by Union soldiers. Grant does not give much detail on
the articles, but he does defend Union armies by stating “At no time do I remember giving an
order for the destruction of property, save for when we occupied Jackson…In fact, whenever our
armies entered a town, it was very frequently their first duty to take care of Southern property
which had been set fire to by Southern armies…[the Union army’s] treatment of the
South…arising out of the Rebellion, was magnanimous.”18 These remarks not only show Grant’s
ability to observe and discuss historical topics, they also show his, and perhaps the entire North,
frustrations with how the war and Reconstruction were being portrayed despite the North’s
victory.
As the nation entered the 20th century, the American professionalization of history
brought in the scientific approach to the discipline. With this, new breeds of historians were
willing to either take up the Lost Cause or challenge it. Most professional historians, not limited
to Southerners only, were willing to participate in Confederate Memorial Day festivities. The
two most prominent scholars on the subject in the early 20th century were William A. Dunning,
and his mentor, John W. Burgess. The Lost Cause already served as the consensus view on the
Civil War and Reconstruction, but the works by Burgess, and especially Dunning, were able to
dominate the American public school system in the North and the South.19
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Before the discussion on Burgess and Dunning can begin, it is important to understand
the attempts at professionalizing American historical scholarship at the turn of the twentieth
century as this had an impact on the reconciliation approach to Reconstruction and eventually on
Grant. This may seem like the discussion is being taken off course, but as historian John Lewis
Gaddis argues, causation in history always has context. The American attempt to professionalize
the discipline of history was largely rooted on the interpretation of the German Wissenschaft.
American students studying in Germany found the German professors quite inspiring as, unlike
American professors, German professors achieved wealth and status in society. Americans
particularly found Leopold von Ranke’s understanding of history very influential as he was a
major proponent of objectivity. Americans believed Ranke was able to reach a level of
objectivity as he wrote without the constraints of patriotism and partisanship. Yet, for all the
idolization of Ranke by American historians, they misinterpreted his contributions and believed
the only correct approach to history was through a scientific means. American hostility to the
speculative philosophy approach to history led to the belief that history should be approached
“for its own sake.” Furthermore, historical investigation should be done according to the
scientific method, which was adapted from the English philosopher Francis Bacon. This in turn
led to the professionalization of history and the creation of the American Historical Association,
in which only twenty-five percent of AHA members between the years 1890-1910 were actual
college professors. 20

20
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Nonetheless, the quest for objective knowledge when discussing a historical topic,
eventually led to the writing of the Civil War and Reconstruction as historical scholarship.
However, the issue of objectivity created a contradiction for American historians as they began
to write on Reconstruction. Inevitably, any discussion on the war and Reconstruction led to the
revival of sectional differences. But in order to bring about the “objective truth” of the Civil War
and Reconstruction, historians presented impartial accounts of the two events. The goal was to
continue the feelings of sectional reconciliation was established at the end of Reconstruction. As
these historians created new scholarship, they aimed to erase sectional conflict with a broad
national patriotism as this represented the best way to heal the wounds of the Civil War and
Reconstruction. The push for reconciliation through historical scholarship began in 1884, the
year the AHA was founded, as the Democratic candidate Grover Cleveland, the first Democrat
elected since before the war.21
Many of the AHA founders were either veterans of the war, or knew of the struggles of
the war as children, and, of course, all shared the experiences of Reconstruction. The founders
and historians incorporated Social Darwinism their scholarship as racism increased during and
after Reconstruction. Scholars on Reconstruction, such as John W. Burgess and William
Dunning, merged scientific racism into their works on the war and Reconstruction. For example,
Burgess’ works on the antebellum era, the Civil War, and Reconstruction were products of
Social Darwinism and the Jim Crow South. Like other historians, Burgess claimed his work to be
scientific history as he avoided secondary sources in search for objective truth. Burgess’
Reconstruction and the Constitution, 1866-1876 proved to be highly influential to Dunning as he
infused scientific racism with a political analysis of Reconstruction, which Dunning argues in his
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works as well. Furthermore, in Reconstruction and the Constitution, Burgess claimed to be
objective through his use of primary source material. Yet, he was blind to the biases in his
sources, and blind to his own biases. While most, if not all, historians writing on Reconstruction
were Southerners, it was the near unanimous racism of the North that allowed scientific racism to
dominate American scholarship in the 1890s. Of course, Northern historians blasted states’
rights, and Southern historians were willing to concede that secession was wrong. But as the
nineteenth century drew to a close, professional historians were highly critical of abolitionists as
they became the agitators of the war, slavery was softened into an almost paternalistic role, and
argued Reconstruction brought on immoral corruption in the Republican Party.22
As American historians sought to create national reconciliation through their scholarship
and in the nation’s school textbooks, an imbalance in interpretations was created as no Northern
historians were teaching in the South. By contrast, many Southerners, including Woodrow
Wilson, Ulrich B. Philips, William P. Trent, and John Spencer, amongst others, taught in
Northern universities. This in turn allowed for the of the Dunning School of Thought on
Reconstruction to become a mainstay in the field, and this form of studying Reconstruction
became popular in American universities as Southerners flocked to study under Dunning. There
were differences in the approaches to Reconstruction as Dunning emphasized a national
approach, while his students focused their arguments on the state and local levels. And unlike
Dunning, who unsuccessfully thinly veiled his racial bias for the most part, his Southern students
centered their arguments in racial and sectional prejudices. While widely admired by his
students, Dunning did produce challengers, most notably, South Carolinian Francis Butler
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Simkins. For example, in South Carolina During Reconstruction, Simkins coauthor Robert H.
Woody, argue that the Radicals were able to successfully implement their political agenda in
South Carolina. This was an early revisionist approach, as it represented a view that
Reconstruction was successful in parts of the postwar South. But with otherwise rare exceptions,
the Dunning School’s interpretations still dominated Reconstruction scholarship until World War
II and the Civil Rights movement brought about profound change in the nation’s views towards
race.23
The school of thought on Grant, and Reconstruction as a whole, that dominated American
public thinking and the minds of all academic scholars interested in the subject was highly
influenced by William A. Dunning of Columbia University and his mentor, John W. Burgess.
Burgess, a political scientist, contributed two works to the academic study of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, The Civil War and the Constitution, 1859-1865 and Reconstruction and the
Constitution, 1866 (1902). The study important to this discussion, Reconstruction and the
Constitution, 1866, is influenced by the Lost Cause ideology. In his work, Burgess applauds
Northern efforts towards Reconstruction as it was an effort to repair the nation after a terrible
war. Additionally, he acknowledges that Reconstruction was an effort to bring back the eleven
states in rebellion, enfranchise blacks and ensure said rights are protected by the Federal
government. The problem for Burgess, lies in the Republican Party’s willingness in “placing the
political power in the hands of the newly emancipated,” and seeking the “nationalization of civil
liberty by placing it under the protection of the Constitution and the national Judiciary...”24
Burgess also believes the Republican Party made an error in holding the South under military
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governance until civil equality was achieved as he argues that by 1866 the Southern states under
Reconstruction were ready to protect civil rights and more than half of Southerners were willing
to pledge loyalty to the Union.
In the chapter, “President Grant and Reconstruction,” Burgess believes black suffrage to
be “entirely unnatural, ruinous, and utterly demoralizing and barbarizing to both races” as he
believes “there is something natural in the subordination of an inferior race to a superior race,
even to the point of enslavement, but there is nothing natural in the opposite.”25 To Burgess, free
blacks were not ready for enfranchisement as they are the inferior race and equality places them
on equal footing with the white race, which he deems unnatural. Military rule was imposed on
the South as a means to force Southerners to accept civil equality and Burgess constantly argues
this to be a tyranny. Burgess argues the Republican officials in the South were corrupt and vulgar
to the point that characteristics “repel the historian from attempting any detailed account of their
doings, and incline him to the vaguest outline.”26
Burgess quietly favors the South and thinly disguises his views, yet it is the discussion
the Ku Klux Klan where Burgess cannot help himself as unleashes a racist tirade. He justifies the
Klan’s reign of terror by blaming Congress for suppressing Southern whites with military rule
and placing political power in the hands of blacks as he argues “it was…rather natural, though
not praiseworthy, that men should have bound themselves together by secret oaths to do
anything…in their power to defeat this blunder-crime against civilization.”27 By not praising the
Klan’s acts, but considering it natural, Burgess gives the impression he is condemning the Klan’s
acts of violence. However, there is little doubt he completely disagrees with the Klan and its role
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in Southern violence. He argues the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments provided
enough power to Congress to protect civil rights and proclaims the Enforcement Acts of 1870 to
1871 to be overreaches of Congressional power as Grant’s policy of enforcement belonged to the
states. It is here that Burgess makes his only reference to Grant as a political agent during
Reconstruction. Prior discussion on Grant during Reconstruction was limited to his role during
Johnson’s fight with the Republican Party. Grant, in this scenario, was not given any political
agency as his feelings of frustration with Johnson's political agenda are not discussed. When
discussing the suspension of habeas corpus by Grant in South Carolina in 1871, Burgess fails to
discuss Grant's views on the protection of blacks and his reasoning for suspending habeas
corpus. Instead he comes to the conclusion that Grant "fell into the arms of the radical
Republicans."28 Grant recognized combating the Klan in the South required the expansion of
federal power, and Burgess argued he appealed to Congress to allow this.
The passing of the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871 represented the dismissal of shared power
between the states and the Federal government for Burgess. The suspension of habeas corpus and
the call for Federal troops to suppress the violence was, Burgess argues, was used by
carpetbagger and "negro" Republicans in an exaggerated manner to get protection. For Burgess,
"it was absolutely necessary for the white people to create some means of united action in selfdefence" as "the vagrancy of the negroes had filled the country with desperadoes who made life,
property, and female honor insecure."29 Burgess is thoroughly convinced that the Republican
government in South Carolina was not willing to aid the white population against this supposed
unlawfulness. Burgess does his best to dismiss Grant's call for the Klan to disperse in South
Carolina and the subsequent use of Federal troops to do so. He does discuss the hundreds of
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arrests made by the army, but quickly questions whether this harsh use of power was necessary.
The dismissal of race as the central issue in Reconstruction makes sense when one considers the
push for Social Darwinism in American scholarship at the turn of the twentieth century. As
Shepard W. McKinley argues in his article, “John W. Burgess, Godfather of the Dunning
School,” Burgess’ shift from more milder discussions on race to racial tirades was largely due to
Burgess and his pupils, including Dunning, adapting elements of Social Darwinism in their
interpretation of Reconstruction.30
Nonetheless, the dispersion of the Ku Klux Klan during Grant's second term in office is a
crucial part of this chapter and while Burgess does not outright question Grant's intelligence, it is
evident he thinks little of him, or least enough to ignore Grant's thoughts on black
enfranchisement. It is unknown, however, if Burgess simply did not have access to the necessary
sources, or if he purposely ignores Grant, or a combination of the two. Although Burgess tries to
present his study of Reconstruction in scientific manner, his beliefs that blacks were racially
inferior, Republicans were entirely corrupt, Reconstruction was terrible event for the South, and
his dismissal of Grant's role, added to the Lost Cause narrative on the event and its participants.
Burgess' influential work and his esteemed position as a political scientist at Columbia provided
the foundation for William A. Dunning's arguments on Reconstruction, including his following
labeled as the Dunning School of Thought. As Dunning’s work was acknowledged as the main
stay of Reconstruction historiography, Burgess’ influence on the subject began to wane during
the 1940s. Although Burgess played an important role in establishing the racism prevalent in
Dunning’s scholarship, the revisionists of the 1960s largely ignored him as they solely placed
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blame on Dunning. This trend continued into modern scholarship as Dunning was still seen as
the main force in Reconstruction historiography.31
For his part, Dunning had his dissertation printed as The Constitution of the United States
in Civil War and Reconstruction, 1860-1867. Dunning then published his signature Essays on the
Civil War and Reconstruction, published in 1897 and later reissued in 1904. Dunning’s major
argument rests on his belief that the war brought about a revolutionary change to the antebellum
relationship between the national government and the state governments, with the states being
able to govern themselves without interference on behalf of the federal government. An example
of this is Dunning’s belief that the expansion of the federal government under Abraham Lincoln
during the Civil War led to a “presidential dictatorship” with Congress quickly filling in the gaps
revealed in the laws. He further explains this argument by asserting a constitutional crisis existed
in the Union as Congress sought to enforce a military government in the South. For Dunning and
his students, the Union occupation of the South during Reconstruction led to military despotism
and allowed for Northern carpetbaggers and free blacks to run amok in Southern legislatures and
usurp power from Southern Democrats. Dunning’s argument targets the decsion by the
Republicans in Congress to divide the South into military districts as he believes the role of
military government in the South allowed the authority of the military commanders to be far too
reaching into the practical operations of the states. For Dunning, the efforts of the abolitionists
failed Reconstruction and declared the efforts by the Radicals and abolitionists allowed for
Southerners to create a new economic system based on slavery. Had the Radicals been less
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assertive, Dunning argued, Southerners would have been more cooperative with the
Republicans.32
To Dunning, Radical Reconstruction was an era of corruption as carpetbaggers from the
North and Scalawags, Southern whites aiding Republicans, tried to further destroy already
defeated Southern values. In addition, Dunning emphasized freed slaves did not posses the
mental capacity to use their new freedom. While scholars following Dunning’s arguments
scarcely discussed freedmen, those that were discussed were deemed ignorant and the school of
thought created played to the Southern fears of being ruled by a “negro government.” This
prejudiced view essentially undermined any role free blacks had in any level of government. But
after unnecessary suffering, Dunning argued, the South’s white community was able to rise up
against the corrupt Radicals and freedmen, band together, and finally restore “home rule,”
basically re-establishing governmental policies based on white supremacy. Dunning claimed the
violent conditions in the South were invented by the radical faction of the Republican Party. But
what is even more startling was his complete dismissal of historical evidence. Dunning claimed
abuse of freedmen and Southern Unionists became less common by 1866. Any unrest that is
mentioned after 1866 is quickly dismissed by Dunning, similar to Burgess’ approach in his
discussion on the Klan. For example, he contends the reason many black tenant farmers were not
receiving pay rested on the white landowners not having money due to the failure of crops. This
claim is dubious at best as it undermines Southern beliefs that a black man could not rise
economically as that made the two races equal.33
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Besides using rhetoric to appeal to a Southern audience, Dunning is much in favor of
President Andrew Johnson as he argues Reconstruction was enforced by Radical Republicans as
they sought to weaken President Andrew Johnson’s efforts to sustain American values. In
defense of Andrew Johnson, Dunning stressed General Ulysses S. Grant did not have the rational
or intellectual capacity to play a pivotal role in Reconstruction, or the war for that matter. This
attack by Dunning became the dominant argument on Grant in the decades following. Dunning
also dismissed Grant’s reputation by insisting that Grant was constantly drunk and that he
ruthlessly sent his men to be slaughtered at the battles of Shiloh, the Wilderness, and Petersburg.
As to be expected, Dunning condemned the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson as he
claimed to be a follower of the Democratic Party. The school of thought argued Johnson and the
Radical Republicans were in a persistent fight to achieve the favor of the most popular man in
America in 1865, Ulysses S. Grant. This popularity gives Dunning justification that Grant was
sought after by Johnson and the Republicans because he the most popular person in the country
and in control of the Army, not because he held significant views on issues. Additionally,
Dunning argued Grant could not fully comprehend the fight between Johnson and the Radical
Republicans because his “political acumen was subnormal.” 34
The Dunning historiography on Grant and Reconstruction continued in the American
public school system for more than half of the twentieth century and elements of it still remain in
the 21st century. Brief challenges to the Dunning School came from black historians, like W.E.B.
DuBois, but these challenges were directed towards the era of Reconstruction and not towards
Grant’s role specifically. Published in 1935, Du Bois’ Black Reconstruction in America, 18601880 is a counterargument to the Dunning School’s established themes on Reconstruction.
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Heavily influenced by Karl Marx, DuBois bases his arguments along economic lines while
stressing slavery as the basis of American labor. DuBois places fault on the white propertied
class and aristocracy for racially dividing black and white labor. It is this racial divide, resulting
in a false sense of economic success, DuBois believes is the reason why whites and blacks could
not unite against the incumbent aristocracy. DuBois stresses Reconstruction failed both white
and black Americans as the Southern Democrats were able to regain control of state governments
and pass racist Jim Crow laws with the determinaton to fully disfranchise blacks after the
Compromise of 1877 ended Reconstruction in the United States. In an impressive effort to
combat the nearly seventy years of “the propaganda of history,” DuBois argues against the
assertions that blacks were the main cause for the failures of Reconstruction. He points to
various instances in which state governments passed legislation to further disenfranchise blacks,
an area either praised or ignored by the Dunning School. While doing this, he staunchly is on the
side of abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison, and dismisses those who did not quickly
embrace emancipation. Because Grant was not abolitionist, he his mostly ignored in Black
Reconstruction in America. While Du Bois does recognize Grant’s sheltering and use of runaway
slaves during the Vicksburg Campaign, he gives Grant little credit for defending blacks and
supporting civil rights legislation as general and president, including President Grant’s use of the
army to eradicate the Ku Klux Klan in 1871.35
DuBois’ arguments were largely ignored by scholars, however, the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s finally allowed historians to reevaluate the historical narrative
established by the Dunning School. This was important for the scholarship on Reconstruction,
but it did not have an impact on Grant’s legacy. His reputation somewhat improved but
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historians and scholars outside of the discipline were still influenced by Dunning. It is difficult to
determine whether these scholars consciously accepted Dunning’s point of view or only did so
because of the defacto domination of Dunning’s views, which became the prevailing wisdom on
Grant for almost a century. Whatever the case may be, the result of this consensus led to the
belief that Grant was single handedly the worst preside in American history, a view that
historians continued to support despite the revisionist turn in Reconstruction scholarship.
A major critic of Grant was William S. McFeely, as he argues that no amount of
revisionism on Grant can change the high casualty rate that occurred under Grant’s generalship.
In his biography on Grant, published in 1981, McFeely ignores Grant’s strong resolve to fight,
unlike other Union generals, and exaggerates the large amounts of corruption that occurred
during Grant’s administration. He additionally faults Grant for the quick conclusion to
Reconstruction that ended free blacks’ hopes for federal protection of their rights. McFeely’s
book, Grant: A Biography, concentrates on Grant’s intellectual capacity, or lack thereof as the
historian argues on a constant basis throughout the book. His arguments are based on a historical
subject, but the main components of the arguments lack proof. The book is largely an attack on
Grant, and does not offer any academic insight. Instead, McFeely opts for ridiculing Grant, as the
book is filled with remarks that insult Grant’s intelligence. Examples of this include sentences
such as: “If Grant had had all the wit and wisdom in the world, it might not have been enough to
bring eleven rebel states into line on Reconstruction.”36 This not only degrades Grant’s ability to
create and enforce policy during Reconstruction, but gives any reader the impression that Grant
was simply a fool. Ironically, McFeely was able to win the Pulitzer Prize for Grant. McFeely is
convinced Grant held a short attention span and no organic intellectual specialness.37
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Aside from deeming Grant to have a low intellectual level, McFeely contributes to the
image of Grant as a butcher general during the Civil War. For example, he condemns Grant for
ending prisoner exchanges with Confederate officials. Although Grant believed exchanging
prisoners replenished Confederate ranks, he stopped the practice because of the Confederate
unwillingness to exchange black Union soldiers. McFeely ignores this in his biography on Grant.
In addition, McFeely blames the high casualty rate at Spotsylvania in 1864 on Grant’s need to be
the first to seize the Confederate capitol at Richmond and thus rob the Republican nomination
from President Abraham Lincoln.38 McFeely dismisses Grant’s continuous assertions to his
generals and Lincoln that he held no desire to be president despite his triumphs on the battlefield.
Grant’s loyalty not only lay with Lincoln, but to the Union and achieving victory on its behalf.
Grant’s two terms as president are further scrutinized by McFeely as he basically believes Grant
was incompetent. Additionally, McFeely contends any form of rational thinking was too
pretentious for Grant, and he argues Grant did not establish any political views.39 Furthermore,
the author ignores Grant’s action on civil rights, and gives this historical agency to those
surrounding Grant. He summarizes the end of Reconstruction as such: “By the summer of 1876
there was no one around the White House gave a damn about black people.”40
This summarization of the end of Reconstruction is problematic as it gives the impression
Grant held an indifference to human suffering. McFeely does not outright make such a claim, but
by arguing Grant was a butcher general who did little to aid blacks and white Republicans in the
South, one cannot help but think Grant lacked sympathy. While Grant wrote little on his feelings
on any issue, careful reading of the evidence available reveals Grant held a distaste for the
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military and the bloodshed that followed it. Speaking to John Russell Young while on his trip on
Hong Kong, Grant said of Cold Harbor: “Cold Harbor, is, I think, the only battle I ever fought
that I would not fight over again under the circumstances.” On Vicksburg, Grant reflected, “I
have always regretted also allowing [General] John H. McClernand to continue his attack on the
works on Vicksburg….The works were not carried, and many unnecessary lives were sacrificed.
Such things are a part of the horrors of war. They belong to the category of mistakes which men
necessarily see to have been mistakes after the event is over.”41 Grant was interviewed by
Russell between 1877 and 1879, and it is clear the horrors of war weighed heavily on his
conscience over a decade after the war came to an end. The scope of Grant’s actions and views
on slavery, emancipation, and civil rights will be thoroughly discussed. But as for McFeely’s
charge that Grant “did not see American Negroes as people to sympathize with,” this can only be
classified as a sweeping generalization. Especially as Grant, through presidential speeches and
through his actions, made strong stances in favor of emancipation and civil rights measures.42
Yet, McFeely fails to take into account these forms of evidence as he merely accepts Grant’s
silence on the issues as a lack of compassion, and at times, Grant’s role in events is simply
omitted. It is unknown if this was done out of a lack of access to sources, or if it was done
purposefully. This results in Grant offering erroneous judgements on Grant, and results in a lack
of proper analyzation of Grant.
As discussed, the conventional interpretation on Grant was not only followed by
historians after the revisionism on the Reconstruction, but by other scholars from other
disciplines. Most academics, including historians, have used this scholarship to rank Grant at the
bottom of most, if not all, presidential rankings. This is the case with psychologists Steven
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Rubenzer and Thomas Fasching as they assess the American presidents and ranked them in
Personality, Character, and Leadership in the White House: Psychologists Assess the Presidents
(2004). This assessment was done with the aid of presidential biographers, journalists, and
scholars. With the consultation of presidential experts and social scientists, Rubenzer and
Fasching examined the psychological and personality features of each president and argue
whether such aspects affected the means of governing. Rubenzer and Fasching compare Grant’s
lack personality and his low intellectual capacity in with other presidents. While the authors do
not mention the Dunning School, it can be concluded they and their consulting scholars were
influenced by it. Rubenzer and Fasching conclude from the data they received from their experts
that Grant suffered from low intelligence, and this conclusion is reached without proper
historical data. Additionally, Grant was ranked low in categories that encompassed intellectual
capability, openness to ideas, and artistic abilities, and they determined that Grant lacked
intellectual or artistic specialness.43 Like McFeely, Rubenzer and Fasching do not praise Grant’s
military strategy in crucial victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg, or
Petersburg. Any large military campaign certainly requires intricate planning, yet Rubenzer and
Fasching still rate Grant with low creativity levels without providing an explanation to their
conclusions. More importantly, they create an illustration of Grant as an individual that is
simplistic and they do not acknowledge his progression on issues like emancipation and civil
equality. As psychologists, Rubenzer and Fasching do not attempt to understand Grant as
individual and the factors that contribute to his complexity as an individual.
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Rubenzer and Fasching argue Grant ranked low personality qualities, and as a result he
was prone to ethical problems while in office His constant need for approval and loyalty forced
the president to oversee the corruption that ran rampant throughout his administration. Rubenzer
and Fasching further emphasize Grant’s lack for innovative thinking and lack of openness to new
ideas. Moreover, the two scholars believe these psychological values are crucial in maintaining a
successful administration. They rate Presidents Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln as the
best presidents in this category as they were constantly open to new ideas and were intellectually
gifted.44 Rubenzer and Fasching do not acknowledge Grant’s evolution in supporting the
abolition of slavery, using freed black men as teamsters and soldiers, and use of the army during
Reconstruction to protect the rights of free blacks. His support of the Fifteenth Amendment, the
support of civil rights legislation as both general and president, and policy of military
enforcement were radical actions were similar to Lincoln’s actions. These actions taken by Grant
were considered to be radical measures as a new social order replaced the antebellum social
order. It is difficult to determine if Rubenzer and Fasching purposefully attacked Grant, but the
two scholars follow McFeely in continuing the flawed assessments on Grant established by
scholars who held views in line with the Lost Cause.
Because the ideas created by the Lost Cause held a strong grip on Civil War and
Reconstruction scholarship, it is unwise to believe they will simply fade with time, but as
historian Eric Foner discusses in his landmark Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution,
1863-1877 (1988), the revisionist wave of the 1960s challenged every form of scholarship that
sought to disfranchise blacks, portray Radicals as idealists genuinely concerned with aid freed
blacks, and began to portray Andrew Johnson as a villain whose sole agenda was to obstruct
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Republican policy in the South. The established argument of “Negro Rule” was labeled as a
myth by revisionist historians. These historians also established that the Republicans’ attempts to
enfranchise blacks and revitalize the devastated Southern economy and infrastructure were
highlighted as a representation of a good government that tried its best. Revisionists also
challenged the corruption scandals that plagued the North by contesting government corruption
long existed in the Federal government prior to the Tweed Ring, Crédit Mobilier, and Whiskey
Ring scandals that shook Grant’s presidency. In short, freedmen were no longer depicted as
incapable of handling freedom, the white supremacist Redeemers were now villains in American
history, and Reconstruction represented a period of radial social change. Yet, despite the revision
on the Republican politicians of Reconstruction, Ulysses S. Grant was still largely ignored, or at
least the scandals of his administration polluted the view on him that scholarship on him
remained relatively unchanged.45
Grant, however, was not completely ignored as the influence of the revisionist movement
is visible in Martin E. Mantell's Johnson, Grant, & the Politics of Reconstruction (1973).
Through his work, Mantell offers a new analysis of Grant's role in the early years of
Reconstruction in which he focuses on the last two years of Johnson's presidency. Central to
Mantell's argument is his reinterpretation of Grant during the political fight between Johnson and
the Radical Republicans. By doing so, he challenges the conventional view to Grant during
Johnson's fight with Congressional Republicans. Mantell effectively argues that Grant played a
large and active political role in the early years of Reconstruction. Mantell challenges previous
arguments that Grant hid his political opinions and protected himself behind Stanton when the
impeachment crisis began. Instead, he uses Grant's official correspondence to argue that the

45

Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, xx.

34
general had supported the Republican agenda since the start of the war. More importantly,
Mantell argues the Republicans had faith in Grant's political and military ability as the
Reconstruction Acts were passed to ensure Grant remained in command of all Union armies, and
this faith was further cemented as Grant was the party's choice for president before the election
in 1868.46
Furthermore, Mantell's interpretation of Grant's political fight with Johnson over the
implementation Reconstruction policy shows the general as keeping a balance between enforcing
Republican policy and demonstrating full subordination to Johnson. It is Grant, the political
novice, who is able to display political moderation while enforcing a political agenda he
supported. Mantell's work is important as it offers a reinterpretation of Grant in the midst of the
historical revisionism of Reconstruction, and he is able to show how Grant's full cooperation
with Republican policies made it possible for the Reconstruction Acts to be implemented. It is
Grant's election, Mantell argues, that served as the capstone to the Republican Reconstruction
policy. In Johnson, Grant, & the Politics of Reconstruction, Grant is given historical agency as
he is no longer shown to be a background character during Johnson's presidency, as Dunning has
argued. Instead, Mantell's work shows Grant had the ability to understand the complex nature of
Civil War politics and manage military policy as he was in charge of five military districts in the
South. Furthermore, his defense of Southern blacks by seeking to rid the South of racial violence
and the Black Codes demonstrated his ongoing acceptance of enfranchisement.47
Eric Foner’s Reconstruction is largely influenced by the revisionist movement of the
1960s as he creates a historical narrative and argument that gives freed blacks agency during
Reconstruction. Elements of DuBois’ arguments are visible as Foner contends Reconstruction
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transformed slaves into free laborers during a period of vast economic, as well as social, change.
Foner largely focuses on the black experience as he argues blacks were not simply the passive
citizens previous scholarship made them to be. Instead, he contends the actions of blacks,
enslaved and freed, helped force the issue of emancipation, and their pursuit of equality and
autonomy helped establish Republican policy during Reconstruction. The central thesis of
Reconstruction is that the era represented a major change in American history as both white and
black citizens sought to use the government, at the federal and local level, to promote own
interests and views as a means to define the new social order. Furthermore, Foner focuses on the
change and complicated nature of racial attitudes during Reconstruction as he demonstrates that
white Southern politicians were willing to side with Republican policies, and he stresses the
relationsip between the white planter class and freed black laborers as one in which white
planters tried to reexert control over black laborers.48
As for the Republican Party, specifically the Radicals, Foner acknowledges the Radicals
sought to further expand Lincoln’s expansion of wartime federal power as they sought to protect
the rights of its citizens. Like other historians influenced by the revisionist movement, Foner
seeks to portray the Republicans as the party that wanted full equality before the law with racist
Southerners, and Southern Democrats in particular, seeking to dismantle this radical
interpretation of the law. This argument is very convincing as Foner provides extensive research
on many Republican politicians, including those at the state and local level. Of course, Southern
opposition persisted as Redeemers sought to restore the antebellum social order in the South and
in the Border States by the 1870s. Foner presents this as the ”challenge of enforcement,” and
brings into this discussion his portrayal of Ulysses S. Grant.49 Foner provides an impressive

48
49

Foner, Reconstruction, xxiii.
Ibid. 231-233, 412.

36
description of the actricoties committed by the Ku Klux Klan and other local whote supremasict
groups. Foner is careful to outline the terror the Klan brought on freedmen, and whites who aided
them economically, socially, and politically, while seemingly blaming the Democratic Party for
not playing a role in stopping the violence.
Because Foner focuses on black agency, he provides instances in which black citizens
armed themselves for defense, but while doing so he blames Republicans for believeing in the
democratic process and not providng adequate defense of its citizens. Foner’s arguments on
Grant during this crisis are mixed at best. He questions Grant’s attitudes towards the South,
despite using his speeches as references. He characterizes Grant as a novice politician that sought
the advice of leading members of Congress. When discussing the Enforcement Acts 1870 and
1871, Foner refers to the Republican Party as a whole embracing the expansion of federal power
to suspend habeas corpus and use the army for enforcement. This argument on the part of Foner
is problematic as Grant assumes the usual role of remaining ambivalent during a crisis and not
taking a decisive role. Additionally, Foner asserts that the use of federal troops to disperse the
Klan in South Carolina represented a ”dramatic departure for the Grant Administration” as he
failed to do this in his previous years as president. To Foner, much of the credit for ending the
Klan’s reign of violence belongs to Grant’s attonery general, Amos T. Akerman and the newly
created U.S. Department of Justice. By doing this, Foner ignores Grant’s views and actions on
enfranchisement and his belief that all citizens deserve equality before the law. Admitingly,
Foner’s Reconstruction does not solely focus on Grant, but his dismissal is problematic as Grant
shared similar ideals Foner argues the Radicals believed in. More importantly, by emphasing
Grant’s ambivalence about using the Army to supress violence in the South, Foner ignores his
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willingness to do so during his time as general-in-chief under Andrew Johnson, an important
aspect of Reconstruction.50
As Reconstruction and Grant underwent reinterpretation, historian Brooks D. Simpson
further reversed the consensual view on specifically Grant. Simpson’s Let Us Have Peace:
Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861-1868 (1991) is a response to
the Dunning School as he argues Grant took an assertive role during the war and during
Reconstruction. While Simpson’s book focuses on the political aspects of the Civil War and the
early years of Reconstruction, he emphasizes Grant as both a warrior and a statesman who
understood the complex nature of war and politics. Simpson additionally argues that to Grant, the
Civil War and Reconstruction were part of the same evolutionary struggle to end the rebellion,
abolish slavery, and protect the rights of freedmen. Simpson further emphasizes Grant’s views
held as lieutenant general during the Civil War later became a part of his presidential agenda.
Simpson’s arguments are a contrast from Dunning’s and McFeely’s as he establishes in his work
Grant’s ability to wage war with the social and political ramifications in mind. By establishing
Grant as a statesman with a political agenda, Simpson disproved previous assertions that Grant
was inept and intellectually challenged. Like Lincoln, Grant’s views on emancipation evolved as
he was by no means an abolitionist. He politically distanced himself from President Andrew
Johnson’s obstruction of Reconstruction and played an active role in policy making during the
early years of Reconstruction. As Simpson argued, Grant’s views created a divide between
himself and Johnson as Grant ensured the gains of the Union were not destroyed by Johnson.
But, Grant’s political stance was evolutionary as early in the war he did not question policy. He
viewed himself as a soldier first and followed orders without question.51
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Following the trend of historical revisionism on Grant, scholars have continued to study
and reevaluate Grant and publish works aimed more at a wider, more general audience. One such
example is Jean Edward Smith’s Grant (2001), which revisits the notion of Grant as both a
successful general and a failed president. Following the scholars who begun the reinterpretation
of Grant, Smith acknowledges Grant’s support for civil rights and argues his support for this
issue has brought Grant condemnation. Smith' Grant largely focuses on Grant's time as a general
and his ambitions to save the Union and preserve the war gains made by the Union at all costs.
This argument is not original as this one component of Simpson’s argument in Let us Have
Peace, but Smith uses Grant's time in the Union Army to show that he was not a "political
bumbler insensitive to the nuances of power."52 Yet, this challenge to the conventional view of
Grant is contradictory to Smith's own claim that Grant was not brilliant. Smith further claims that
Grant viewed Reconstruction as the creation of a new social revolution as freed slaves were to be
fully integrated into American society. Additionally, Smith argues Grant defended Southern
blacks with "the same tenacity that held the Union line at Shiloh."53 All of these contradictory
claims lead to Grant portraying a confusing view of the general. It is difficult to accept an
individual as not being brilliant or competent, yet able to demonstrate political skill by arguing
on the constitutionality and morality of enfranchising a portion of the population once held in
bondage.
Smith’s confusing view of Grant’s continues as he claims the general was not “visited by
the flashes of inspiration that animated Stonewall Jackson. He did not have Lee’s Olympian
presence.” Finally, “[Grant’s] mind lacked the subtleties of Lincoln’s thought.” 54 Thomas
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“Stonewall” Jackson and Robert E. Lee were arguably the two best generals the Confederacy
produced. But by placing Jackson and Lee over Grant, Smith spreads the argument raised by the
proponents of the Lost Cause in the late nineteenth century that minimizes Grant’s excellent
ability to wage a military campaign. It furthers adds to the notion that Grant was only able to
defeat Lee because of his superior numbers in men and supplies, and not by his remarkable
military skill or ability to influence his men. Whether he did this knowingly or not is unknown,
but Smith allows this component Lost Cause argument to survive into the twenty-first century
historical scholarship. Whereas Mantell and Simpson formed their respective arguments from
letters, diaries, and correspondence by Grant and individuals close to him, Smith appears to
ignore such sources, or at the very least overlooks those that demonstrate Grant’s thinking or
perception of it. Simpson is able to argue Grant evolved and accept the political aspects of the
war, including emancipation. In contrast, Smith simply depicts Grant as having rapidly reached
the conclusion that civil rights must be not threatened. For those who were not staunch
abolitionists and fought the war for Union first, like Lincoln and Grant, their coming to accept
emancipation and enfranchisement should be studied more carefully as it was surely an internal
struggle and process for them.
H.W. Brands’ The Man Who Saved the Union: Ulysses S. Grant in War and Peace (2012)
impressively encompasses Grant’s entire life and times is more focused on a biographical
narrative instead of creating new arguments. Brands’ central concern is appears to be focused
with writing a romantic tale of Grant’s life as he portrays him as not only rising from his
troubles, but being the only elected official in the country who cared for freedmen. Brands
describes Grant’s feelings on civil rights as such: “[Grant] could only claim only modest
success…in these endeavors, not because bad men defeated him but because good men…weary
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of sectional strife…found other things to worry about.”55 This is certainly true, the general
feeling throughout the country at the end of Grant’s second term in office was one of weariness.
But by giving Grant the credit of being the only individual who cared about civil rights, not only
ignores other supporters of civil rights, but presupposes Grant was always in favor of
emancipation and enfranchisement. It also ignore the dynamics of the Civil War that allowed for
emancipation, such as it freeing slaves as contraband or the use of freed slaves for military
purposes. It was these aspects of the war that allowed Grant to accept the abolition of slavery,
and eventually the enfranchisement of freed men and women, and Brands is not able to
demonstrate this. He does an excellent job in showing the political criticism Grant received
following radical acts, such as his handling of the Ku Klux Klan.56
Brands’ The Man Who Saved the Union, like Smith’s Grant, is important to the
scholarship on Grant as it was meant to appeal to a general audience while advancing arguments
original to the revisionism on Grant. Unlike Smith, Brands does not feel the need to attack
Grant’s intelligence. Brands is able to show Grant’s ability to wage war with Lincoln’s policy in
mind, and with the pressures of the press and Congressional politicians. Additionally, Brands
demonstrates Grant’s willingness to utilize runaway slaves for military purposes and to protect
freedmen during Reconstruction. However, Brands does not give the reader the sense that Grant
gradually moved from emancipation, to giving support to the enlistment of black soldiers, to the
protection of freedmen during Reconstruction. Instead, Brands reasons employing former slaves
in the Union Army and eventually arming them was a natural step. However, allowing this
cannot be considered a natural step as this suggests every Union soldier, politician, and citizen
found it easy to accept freed slaves as black soldiers. Brands also shows Grant’s willingness to
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protect freedmen during Johnson’s time as president as he argues this to be the chief cause for
the division between the two. There is no denying Brands’ work is important as he attempts to
restore Grant’s historical reputation through extensive research. But because his work is aimed at
a general audience, it suffers from the proper analysis of such sources that might allow for a
deeper understanding of Grant’s thinking. Instead, Brands provides a broad view of the events
Grant participated in.57
This presented historiography is by no means a full comprehensive overview of Grant or
Reconstruction. However, its goal is to demonstrate where within Civil War and Reconstruction
scholarship Grant fits as this allows for the understanding as to why Grant has long been
dismissed as a failure. A trend is noticeable in the scholarship represented. Those who seek to
give an overview of Reconstruction have a tendency to ignore Grant’s role, perhaps as they
question his intelligence to act in political situations, or perhaps they simply do not believe him
to have played a role. It is also quite possible the scandals that surfaced during his administration
do not allow scholars to seriously consider Grant as a political thinker. Yet, it is the scholars who
attempt to fully understand Grant’s thinking and actions on emancipation and enfranchisement
that reveal he was a man who should not be compared with Lee or Lincoln as he held his own
principles on war and politics.
Like Mantell, Simpson’s interpretation of Grant certainly not only shows a man with the
capability of not only planning extensive military campaigns, but able to plan military campaign
with policy in mind. Simpson’s scholarship is part of a more recent fight to reestablish Grant’s as
one of the nation’s better presidents. This modern scholarship on Grant, including historians such
as H.W. Brands, is crucial, but it is in some respects limited. While attempting to reverse the
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Dunning interpretation, historians, such as Brands, Simpson, and Foner, base their arguments on
certain policies Grant supported on behalf the Union or civil equality. This represents an almost
linear view of Grant as these arguments are simply based on policies and the assumption that
Grant always supported them. One of the most puzzling aspects of Grant is Grant himself.
Still, Grant firmly believed in the Constitution and the laws it embodies, as this was his
central moral principle. Every policy he believed in and every view he held were only a means to
preserve the Union. It is difficult to assert whether he believed in issues like emancipation as
morally right because he often contradicts himself. This is not a negative attack on Grant as
Lincoln was contradictory as well, but this does lead to the assertion that Grant was just as
complex as Lincoln and trying to understand him as an individual is the best way to combat the
consensual view, as opposed to simply arguing on behalf of certain policies.
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CHAPTER III
LIFE BEFORE THE WAR
Like many Americans of his time, Ulysses S. Grant’s life was marked by sectional
divide, party politics, westward expansion, and the question of slavery. In his Personal Memoirs,
Grant writes about his childhood, and it was centered on his father, Jesse Grant. Grant
summarizes his childhood as such, “I did not like to work; but I did as much of it, while young,
as grown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at the same time.”58 After
watching his father waste money, opportunity, and take to the bottle, Jesse established a restless
ambition as he searched to find success in the world. At the age of sixteen he apprenticed with
his half-brother, and then took on jobs at several Ohio tanneries. One such tannery was owned by
a man named Owen Brown, whose son John, ferociously opposed slavery. Jesse agreed with the
sentiments, explaining later he left Kentucky for Point Pleasant, Ohio as he could not live in an
area that made use of the institution. After settling for work at a tannery, Jesse met Hannah
Simpson and the two wed on June 24, 1822. Hannah then gave birth to a red haired baby boy
named Hiram Ulysses on April 27.59
One year after Grant’s birth, Jesse Grant sold his tannery in Point Pleasant and moved his
family to Georgetown, where he gained prominence for his political views. Grant wrote more
about his father than he did his mother and he described his father as being an English scholar
who contributed commentary to Western newspapers. Jesse, as described by Grant, was very
active in politics, and although he ran for office just once, was an able debater. Jesse held a
preference for Andrew Jackson, however, he devoted himself to the Whig Party. He then
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developed an admiration for Henry Clay and did not vote for a Democrat for higher office after
Jackson. He further displayed his views when he claimed he refused to raise his family in the
South and moved from Kentucky to raise his family on free soil. Additionally, Jesse wrote for
the Castigator, a newspaper with antislavery sympathies.60
Author Hamlin Garland describes Jesse as not only a Yankee, but a “natural radical” and
always ready to argue.61 Jesse expected his son to partake in the tannery business, however
young Ulysses showed no interest in participating in the business. Grant "detested the trade,
preferring almost any other trade...[he] was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in which
horses were used."62 Young Ulysses most despised having to feed tanbark into a hopper of the
macerating machine. Aside from showing a fondness for horses, young Ulysses did not display
any useful skills and was remarkably ambivalent on learning any potential trade. Only in
mathematics did he display any real talent. Lacking any other alternative, Jesse believed that the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point was best for his son, not so much for a military career, but
because the academy held a reputation for being the best engineering school in the country.
Grant for his part, was not particularly enthusiastic about attending West Point. While he had no
strong objections to it, he had an "exalted idea of the acquirements necessary to get through.
[Grant] did not believe [he] possessed them, and could not bear the idea of failing."63 Jesse, a
supporter of Henry Clay, was able to get his son nominated to attend West Point by swallowing
his pride and asking his congressman, John Hamer, who supported Andrew Jackson’s crusade
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against the banks, for the favor. The townspeople questioned Ulysses' appointment as the
seventeen year old did not emit any sort of talent, nothing was exceptional about him.64
Nonetheless, Grant headed to West Point and was not eager to arrive at the academy.
Grant later reflected that he would have been content had an accident occurred on the steamboat
and railroad he was traveling on, in which he might have received a small injury. Anything to
return to Ohio with honor intact. But he could not steer the trip off course, and young Ulysses
"had to face the music."65 While at West Point, he developed a distaste for military life as he
found the drilling to be tedious, the uniforms to be ridiculous, and the discipline annoying. As for
his studies, Grant admitted he did “take hold of his studies with advitity,” and he hardly read for
his lessons.66 Instead, Grant spent his time in the library and devoted his time to reading the likes
of Washington Irving, Walter Scott, and James Fenimore Cooper. He never really exerted
himself to do much at West Point, save for setting the academy’s horsing high jump record, and
he graduated from West Point in 1843 ranked twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine.67
At West Point, Grant met a young man by the name of Fredrick Dent, and after frequent
visits to the Dent home, began courting his sister, Julia Dent. He did not plan to remain in the
army for too long as he sought to become an assistant professor of mathematics at West Point,
and Grant continued to review his math lessons from West Point while stationed at Jefferson
Barracks. Whatever plans Grant may have had after his time in the army were put on hold as
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problems between the United States and Mexico erupted into war. The dream of western
expansion, fueled by the belief in Manifest Destiny, accelerated in the 1830s as pioneers traveled
along the Oregon Trail and towards the west coast of the continent. These new territories, such as
California, New Mexico, and Texas, seemed ripe for the picking and were loosely tied to the
Mexican government. American settlement began in Texas in the 1820s when the Mexican
government encouraged emigration. After its independence from Spain in 1821, it faced the
same problem Spain did concerning Texas: a vast area of territory that was thinly populated.
Anglo Americans already occupied East Texas, as the Spanish allowed them to do so, and
Mexican leaders believed allowing more Americans to enter Texas, under certain conditions,
might fill the open space with a vast population. Governor Antonio Martinez allowed Stephen F.
Austin to continue Moses Austin’s original 300 settler plan and bring in more Americans to
Texas. By 1830, approximately 10,000 Anglo Americans lived in Texas and by 1834,
Americans, concentrated in the eastern portion of the province, outnumbered native Mexicans
four to one.68
Tensions between the American settlers eventually reached a boiling point and Texas
won its independence from Mexico after Santa Anna was captured at the Battle of San Jacinto on
April 21, 1836. Because of their close ties to the United States, Texans immediately wanted
annexation by the United States instead of independence. Yet, the proposal to add Texas to the
Union was disputed as Texas recognized slavery. Southern states pushed for annexation, while
Northern politicians voiced their objections. By 1844, President John Tyler, a slaveholder from
Virginia, allowed his secretary of state, John C. Calhoun, to open negotiations with Texas
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president Sam Houston for possible annexation. The United States Army was sent to the Texas
southern border with Mexico as a show of force and to ensure that Mexico did not intervene.69
As the debate raged over the annexation of Texas, Grant followed the events as a second
lieutenant in the army. On the war with Mexico and annexation of Texas, Grant later wrote in his
memoirs, “For myself, I was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war
which resulted as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation.”70
Grant viewed the independence annexation movements in Texas as conspiracies to “acquire
territory out of which slave states might be formed for the American Union.”71 It is important to
note that Grant wrote this in his Personal Memoirs, so he had the advantage of hindsight. While
traveling in China 1879, he further recollected to John Russell Young his distaste for the
Mexican War. Grant insisted to Young, “I know the struggle with my conscience during the
Mexican War. I had very strong opinions on the subject. I do not think there was ever a more
wicked war than that waged by the United States on Mexico.”72 Grant’s dislike for the war with
Mexico perhaps reveals a dislike for unnecessary war for the sake of territorial acquisition. In
addition, his belief that the war was meant to acquire territory for the slave states, may be an
indication that Grant did not believe in the institution of slavery as a goal worth waging a war
over. The Mexican War ended in 1848 after the American capture of Mexico City. Because
Mexico did not have a government capable of creating a peace treaty, Santa Anna resigned and
went into hiding, the Americans remained in Mexico for ten months. The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo was signed in 1848 and called for Mexico to cede all land north of the Rio Grande,
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Upper California, and New Mexico. Additionally, the United States agreed to pay $15 million to
Mexico in claims against Mexican citizens. For Grant, his ten months in Mexico proved to be
quite enjoyable. While he longed for Julia, Grant developed a fondness for Mexico and its
people. Along with his fellow officers, Grant toured the Mexican countryside from where the
regiment was stationed, Tacubaya. The tour included spelunking the limestone caves at
Cuernavaca and attending the racetrack. He returned home after the treaty was signed and
married Julia Dent that August.73
Upon leaving the army, Grant faced difficult financial struggles as the next seven years of
his life were marred with economic difficulty. He was without money after several ill-fated
economic deals while in the army and remained so following his resignation from the army.74
Grant struggled to support his family, which grew to include four children, he was occasionally
destitute, and mostly worked small jobs. Disappointed at Grant's resignation from the army,
Jesse came up with an idea that might relieve Grant of his predicament. He offered his son
employment in the family business. There was a catch, however. Grant could work at the family
general store with his brothers, Simpson and Orvil, located in Galena, Illinois. Julia could then
stay with the Grants in Covington, Kentucky. This was an insensitive move on the part of Jesse
as he understood how much Grant missed his family. As such, Grant turned down the offer and
the family returned to St. Louis. Grant and Julia received counteroffer from her father, a
slaveholder and merchant named Colonel Fredrick Dent. Julia received sixty acres of land south
of the family home in White Haven as a wedding present by her father. Not only would this keep
Julia close to home, but Dent hoped he could help his son-in-law become a farmer. For his part,
Grant did his best to clear the land and build a home for the family. Julia detested the home.
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Made of timber, it resembled a pioneer home, and Grant humorously named it Hardscrabble.
Grant did the best he could to work the land as he only had one team of horses, one field hand,
and was often unable to buy seed. After hinting to his father that he needed financial assistance,
Grant outright asked Jesse for aid in 1857. Grant inquired of Jesse for a loan of five hundred
dollars with ten percent interest. With this, Grant believed he could make his financial troubles
disappear. Jesse did not reply and continued to withhold his money.75
To earn a meager fifty dollars, Grant stood on the streets of St. Louis, asking passers-by
to purchase firewood. Like most Americans, he was hit by the Panic of 1857 in which he pawned
his last valuable possession, a gold watch, so he and his family could celebrate Christmas. The
Grants’ situation slightly improved when Julia’s father moved from his home, White Haven, and
rented the home to the family in 1858. Managing the Dent farm meant overseeing slaves. The
precise number is not known, but historian Brooks D. Simpson points to the 1850 census that
reports thirty Dent slaves used at the White Haven property and the family home in St. Louis.76
Because most of these slaves were Julia’s household servants that became the Grants’ marital
property upon their marriage, Grant hired field hands.77 Yet it is difficult to track Grant’s views
towards the use of Col. Dent’s slaves. Evidence reveals that when Grant began farming, he wrote
to his sister Mary "I have now three negro men, two hired by the year and one of Mr. Dents,
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which, with my own help, I think, will enable me to do my farming pretty well, with assistance
in harvest."78 Grant treated the black hired help with respect as they were fellow laborers who
worked beside him. As such, he paid these workers more than his white neighbors would have
liked.
Grant’s use of slaves is quite interesting. He obviously was willing to using slave labor as
his letter to his sister revealed this. Furthermore, evidence thus far does not reveal any
abolitionist views on the part of Grant, nor does it point to Grant believing slavery to be the
natural order of blacks most southerners believed in. This is not surprising given that Grant was a
relatively soft spoken man. To add to this puzzle, Grant demonstrated a willingness to work with
Dent’s slaves instead of allowing them to work the field alone. It is unclear why Grant worked
with them, but he may not have been unique in doing this as he decided to work with slaves
while living in Missouri, a state divided on the institution. Perhaps he worked the land as well
through principle as it was his role as the head of the family to provide for his family. Grant may
have also viewed the three black laborers without the racist perceptions accompanied with
slavery and as simply the required help needed to provide for his family. Unlike the Dents, Grant
was from Ohio where the belief in Northern free labor viewed slave labor as an affront to work
ethic and success. He may have been influenced by his father’s antislavery views, although
evidence does not exist to support this. As Eric Foner discusses in Free Soil, Free Labor, Free
Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War, the Northern, and mostly
Republican, concept of free labor was a social ideology in which it expressed a model for a good
society as the dignity of labor offered economic and social success for the laborer, with emphasis
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on the independent farmer and small shopkeeper.79 Grant was no means an abolitionist, but
having been raised in a society that advocated hard work and marked slavery as a stain on
society, Grant may have at least been uncomfortable with working and purchasing slaves, and
this may explain why he worked with them. Although he may not have been unique in working
with slaves, and despite his silence on the issue, Grant’s actions reveal a pattern in his thinking:
he acted in a situational manner; one that aided him to achieve his goals. In this case, his main
concern was the welfare of his family. If he held the Northern pride of hard labor and distaste of
slavery, he set that aside to for the benefit of his family.80
Grant’s struggles continued after he acquired real estate business, given to him by
Colonel Dent. Grant worked with Harry Boggs, the nephew of Dent. While working at Boggs &
Grant in 1858, Grant was tasked with keeping records, pushing listings, and collecting rent.
Grant quickly showed he was unfit for the business as he was too sympathetic when collecting
rent and not aggressive enough when it came to selling real estate. Grant withdrew from the
partnership in 1859 and continued to seek employment to provide for his wife and children.81
During this time, Grant came into possession of one slave, thirty-five year old William Jones,
and his actions regarding ownership of Jones are puzzling, if not interesting. It is difficult to
determine if Jones was the same individual Grant referred to when he wrote his sister, but he was
the only slave Grant ever owned as he purchased Jones from Dent, and it is known that Julia
owned at least two slaves. Grant contemplated renting Jones out in St, Louis, which would have
made sense as he needed the money, but decided against it. The fact that Grant purchased a slave
and contemplated renting Jones is surprising, given his later actions as general and president.
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However, March 29, 1859, Grant filed manumission papers at a circuit court and emancipated
Jones.82 Grant never discussed his actions, and an able bodied male such as Jones could have
earned Grant money on the slave market at a time when he needed the money. This action on the
part of Grant, despite his willingness to at least use slave labor, speak profoundly. He badly
needed the money, yet he refused to rent out Jones or sell him. But with little to no economic
prospects, Grant became desperate. His appeals to his father by early 1860 failed to produce any
results as Jesse continued to ignore his son's pleas. At the request of Julia, Grant gathered what
little cash he had, bought a train ticket for Kentucky, and visited his father to ask for help once
more. Grant previously asked for help based on his terms, now he was willing to accept his
father's terms. The arrangement called for Grant to move to Galena, Illinois and help his two
younger brothers, Simpson and Orvil, operate their father's leather store. Grant would start as a
salaried employee at the store. Although relived her husband found work, Julia was not
enthusiastic about leaving Missouri, as this meant leaving her slaves behind. While Julia adjusted
to life without her servants, Grant finally found life to be satisfactory.83
Perhaps an examination of the political aspect of slavery can allow for the understanding
of Grant’s views on slavery prior to the war. It is difficult to determine his moral views towards
slavery prior to the war as there is little evidence left by Grant to show a firm stance on the issue.
His use of slave labor reveals that he held no qualms about using slave labor, yet his willingness
to work with slaves and lack of evidence overtly expressed racial prejudice suggest he may
accepted have accepted the institution to better his economic situation. Having been born in Ohio
and to a Whig father, Grant was exposed to antislavery and Northern notions of free labor and
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free soil found in the political ideology of the Whig and Republican Parties. As previously
discussed, Grant’s father, Jesse, switched political allegiances from the Jacksonian Democrats to
the Whig Party. His firm stance against slavery led him to refuse in raising his family in the
South, and the Grant family moved from Kentucky to raise his family on free soil. Additionally,
Grant biographer Hamlin Garland claims Jesse helped found an abolitionist society in Kentucky
in 1823, where Ulysses attended boarding school. It is unclear if the slavery issue was discussed
in the Grant household, and Jesse’s story is mixed as he moved to Covington in slaveholding
Kentucky after Ulysses left home.84 Grant for the most part, does not help clear the issue on his
father or his childhood as he is silent on the issue in his Memoirs. Still, having lived in Ohio, and
assumedly under a father with antislavery views, attended school in Kentucky, and attended the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Grant was exposed to various arguments concerning
slavery.
Neighbors in Missouri recalled Grant’s contempt for the institution and its expansion, but
Grant disliked radical abolitionists as he believed they endangered the Union. Grant’s antebellum
political affiliations are interesting, if not contradictory. He was a member of the Know-Nothing
Party, a nativist party, but evidence does not suggest that he held any of the racial views attached
to the party or even the Democratic Party. He also blamed the secession of the Confederate
States on the territory gained from the war with Mexico, as Southerners wanted to spread slavery
westward and possibly into Central America, yet he was not an abolitionist. What Grant does
make clear in his letters, however, is his belief in the Union. Like many of the conservative
Republicans, it is evident Grant was not willing to sacrifice the Union for the cause of slavery as
war approached, despite not having a firm stance on the slavery issue. As Abraham Lincoln
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ascended to the top of the Republican Party, he assured Southerners, in the fashion of a moderate
Republican that he was not going to interfere with slavery and promised to uphold the integrity
of the Union. Lincoln argued slavery would gradually die once the institution had been contained
to the South. The moderates, with Lincoln as president, argued the need to end slavery and
uphold the Union.85 As war began in 1861, Grant began to identify with these interlocking
principles.
Grant’s firm belief in the Union was rooted in the Republican Party’s ideology in the
decades preceding the war. At the center of this ideology during the sectional crisis was the
belief in “free labor,” which was in stark contrast to the defenders of slavery. These differences
divided the North and the South into two distinct sections, and the Republicans believed two
different, antagonistic civilizations dominated the political system. The free labor ideology not
only appealed to nearly all Northerners, it catalyzed Northerners of all backgrounds into
collective action. At its core, free labor was based on the view that laborers should take pride in
their work. Free labor was not only a defense of capitalism, it was also a firm attack on Southern
society. Free labor was an economic theory of value, in which capital was the source of labor.
Lincoln declared in 1859 that “labor is prior to, and independent of capital…in fact, capital is the
fruit of labor.”86 In addition, the Republican idea of free labor was part of the expanding,
competitive Union. Given their economic views of labor, it is not difficult to conclude why
Republicans were repulsed, literally, with Southern society. Slavery created a static society in
which it was difficult for those without slaves to advance in society. For the Republicans, free
labor was imbedded in a middle class ethos, for the successful laborer was one who obtained
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self-employment, and owned capital or a business.87 This principle did not necessarily lead
Republicans to propose the abolition of slavery, however. Only the most ardent abolitionists
favored full equality for the slave in the antebellum years. Like the Democrats, some
Republicans, particularly Old Line Whigs who embraced Know-Nothingism, used racist rhetoric
in campaign speeches. But for the most part, most Republicans favored at least the basic human
rights for slaves.
The conservative faction of the Republican Party, grown out of the old Whig Party, held
supporters from lower New York, Pennsylvania, southern Indiana, Ohio, Iowa, and Illinois. It is
this faction of the party Grant may have identified with in 1850s and may help explain Grant’s
approach to slavery. The radical and conservative factions wished to rid the political system of
Slave Power. However, the conservatives believed that with the election of a Republican
president, slavery would suddenly die, and the country could turn its full attention of economic
development. This faction of the party intensely disliked slavery, but was unwilling to jeopardize
the Union for the sake of interfering with slavery. Unlike the radicals, conservatives did not view
anti-slavery as the centerpiece of their political ideology. These Old Line Whigs accepted Clay's
belief that the federal government was an active agent in improving the country, and accepted his
views that the nation was bound together for the sake of national improvement. The Union, for
many Republicans, was rooted in their free labor ideology as labor-based economic mobility was
the only way American democracy could spread across the continent and become a beacon of
envy across the globe. The expansion of slavery into the western territories threatened this as it
prevented free, white workers from settling there.88
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The moderate faction of the Republican Party between the mid-1850s and early 1860s
held the balance of power within the party. Like the conservatives, the moderates disliked
slavery and the rhetoric of prominent radicals, such as Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner.
Unlike the conservatives, however, moderates recognized that the issue of slavery could not be
kept out of the national spotlight or replaced with other issues. The moderates agreed with the
radicals that the election a Republican president would eradicate slavery. Where they differed
however, was the timing. To the radicals, slavery was a so immoral that it must be abolished
once a Republican assumed the White House. The moderates were willing to wait as they
believed the institution would gradually end.89 Still, conservatives and moderates, like Lincoln,
believed the government held interests that transcended the issue of slavery, namely keeping the
country together. This was certainly Grant’s view during the election of 1856 in which the
Republican Party ran its first presidential candidate, John C. Frémont against James Buchanan.
Because Southerners deemed all Republicans to be in favor of emancipation, the threat of
secession was deemed the only option to protect their interests. Grant believed if Frémont were
to be elected, the entire South was to secede from the Union. Because of this Grant “preferred
the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or postpone secession.”90 Grant voted
for Buchanan, the Democratic nominee in 1856, and the secession crisis was averted for four
more years.
Secession, in Grant’s mind, was unconstitutional, and for the sake of keeping the country
together he voted for Buchanan. He defended his actions, which included voting straight for the
Democratic ticket, to his father by reasoning, “I voted for [Buchanan] for President to defeat
Frémont but not because he was my first choice. In all other elections I have universally selected
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the candidates that in my estimation, were the best fitted for the different office and it never
happens that such men are all on one side.”91 Grant further recalled to Young during his trip to
China, that although he voted for Buchanan in 1856, he identified with the Whig Party as he was
an admirer of Henry Clay. It is evident Grant voted based on policy, and not along party lines.
Like his use of slaves, Grant acted pragmatically and on what choice yielded the greatest benefit,
this time on what he deemed was the best for the country. He believed a Republican president
might have caused Southern states to secede. We may never know if this was the case, but Grant
was not willing to take that risk and he voted in a practical manner.
He further reasoned, “I have no objection to the Democratic Party as it existed before the
war…before the war, whether a man was Whig or Democrat, he was always for the country.”92
Grant did not vote for a candidate in the presidential election of 1860 as he did not live in Galena
long enough to vote. He was, however, still in favor of the Democratic Party and would have
voted for Stephen A. Douglas, but later acknowledged the election was really between John C.
Breckinridge and Abraham Lincoln, whom he wanted to win between the two. Grant’s political
affiliations are difficult to understand. He writes of being affiliated with the Whig Party as his
father did the same, and admitted to being a member of the American Party, or the KnowNothing Party. This party was essentially anti-Catholic and nativist in sentiment, but Grant
decided to end his time with the party as he later explained, “no political party can or ought to
exist when one of its cornerstones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the right to worship
God.” Although he voted for a Democratic ticket before the war, no evidence can be found
where Grant echoes the nativist sentiments of the Know-Nothings or those of the Democratic
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Party. All historical evidence thus far points to his views being in line with elements of the
Republican Party. Yet, his confession to his not casting a vote for the party, does also point to his
own pragmatism and moderation in light of his core principle, Union first.93
A horrible civil war, as it has been recounted on numerous occasions, erupted in the
United States with South Carolina's exit from the Union in 1860. One side claimed to be
defending the rights of sovereign states, the other sought to preserve the Union and uphold the
sovereignty of the nation. Imbedded in states’ rights for Southerners, was of course, the right to
uphold the institution of slavery. But for Northerners, the mere threat of secession was traitorous.
Like his fellow Northerners, Grant deemed secession to be illogical as it sought to stir up a
revolution. For Grant, revolution was only needed when a government became overbearing and
tyrannical. Secession threatened the Founding Fathers’ efforts to create a democracy, for the
Constitution, does not allow newer states to secede as they did not hold that right, only the
original thirteen held that early right as colonies.94 For Grant, the nation must obey the
Constitution, and also “must enforce the strictest construction of that instrument,” as the
Founders did not plan for secession, for “if they had forseen it, the probabilities are they would
have sanctioned the right of a State or States to withdraw rather than that there should be war
between brothers.”95 Grant wrote this in his memoirs and had the luxury of time to reflect on the
war and Reconstruction, but his words should not be dismissed. He writes on secession in with
an ability to argue in a political debate that shows an understanding of the work of the Founding
Fathers and the government they created, not just for themselves, but for future generations. This
is especially evident as he deems secession as, “preposterous to suppose that the people of one
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generation can lay down the best only rules of government for all who are to come after
them…”96
Grant understood Southern individualism to be the cause of the war as he believed a fair
discussion on the issue of slavery could have prevented civil war. Instead, Grant writes in his
memoirs that the unbridled passions of Southerners over slavery clouded their judgment. He
further argues that non-slave owners “were looked down upon by those who controlled all the
affairs in the interest of the slave owners, as poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so
long as they cast it according to direction.”97 He blamed Buchanan for the crisis as he believed
the president he voted for to be “a granny of an executive.”98 Despite his opinion of Buchanan,
Grant held a moderate approach to politics as he believed a fair, temperate discussion could have
prevented war. Grant’s dismissal of secession and firm belief in the Union may appear to be onedimensional, yet Grant was not the only individual in the North to believe this. The principles of
the permanence of the Union was a superbly powerful sentiment. This firm belief in the
preservation of the Union was held by Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln believed the “perpetuity [of the
Union] is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of national governments” and that
“no government, proper, ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination.”99
Lincoln’s views represented the dominant view of the country: the Union, as the Founding
Fathers formed, was forever and could not be destroyed by internal dissension.
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CHAPTER IV
GRANT DURING THE CIVIL WAR
For Grant, the Civil War was the major component to the evolution of his views on
slavery and belief of full civil equality for black Americans. As the war progressed Grant shifted
from keeping out of political matters to understanding that policymaking and military action
were one policy, especially concerning emancipation. Grant recalled to John Russell Young,
during his world tour following his second term in office, that as he reentered the army in 1861,
he did so with the firm belief that a soldier must keep his political biases separate from military
duty. Grant reasoned “What interfered with our officers more than anything else was allowing
themselves a political bias. That is fatal to a solider. War and politics are so different.”100 As
such, Grant initially re-entered the army with one single objective: suppressing the rebellion.
Grant was not one to be easily aroused by pompous patriotism, yet he “could not endure the
thought of the Union separating…it made [his] blood run cold to hear friends of [his], Southern
men…deliberately discuss the dissolution of the Union as though it were a tariff bill.”101 The
strong attachment to the Union was an extremely powerful one to Grant as he recounted to
Young, “I never thought of commands or battles. I only wanted to fight for the Union. That
feeling carried me through the war. I never felt any special pleasure in my promotions. I was
naturally glad when they came. But I never thought of it.”102 Grant entered the war with only one
goal: to see a quick end to the war with the rebellion suppressed and the Union together.
While he did not agree in a state's right to leave the Union, Grant was relatively
disengaged from the national discussion prior to the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, in April
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1861. Like most towns across the nation in 1861, Galena was electrified with the news of the
attack and its congressman, Elihu Washburne, offered several meetings to affirm the
community’s devotion to the Union. Grant attended a meeting and shared in the excitement.103
Grant had been an individual who failed at almost any enterprise he entered, except war. Unlike
the Mexican war, Grant believed he could devote himself to the cause of this war. Two days after
Fort Sumter fell, on April 15, 1861, President Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 volunteers to put
down the states in rebellion. Lincoln called for all citizens to aid the war effort and to “maintain
the honor, integrity, and the existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of popular
government.”104 Lincoln's proclamation let loose a flood of patriotic fervor as men rushed to
answer the President's call. Grant defended Lincoln's call to Col. Dent, a defender of states’
rights, by insisting, "I know it is hard for men to apparently work with the Republican Party but
now all party distinctions should be lost sight of and evry true patriot be for maintaining the
integrity of the glorious old Stars & Stripes, the Constitution, and the Union."105
The state of Illinois was assigned a quota of six regiments. A large meeting took place in
Galena in which Grant, being the only man in town with military experience, became the center
of attention. Governor Richard Yates kept Grant in Springfield to drill men, file paperwork, and
inspect weapons. Brigadier-General John Pope urged Grant to return to the army, offering to use
his influence in Illinois politics to secure him a position. Grant, grateful for the offer, refused the
political support. This show of modesty nearly kept him out of the war. Yet, aiding Yates with
the volunteers gave Grant a sense of satisfaction he had not previously felt. Upon completion of
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his duties to Yates, Grant wrote to his father, Jesse Grant, “I have tendered my services to the
Government and go to-day to make myself useful, if possible, from this until all our national
difficulties have ended. During the six days I have been home I have felt all the time as if a duty
was being neglected that was paramount to any duty I ever owed. I have [every] reason to be
well satisfied with myself for the services already rendered but to stop now would not do.”106
Grant then wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army, General Lorenzo Thomas, that he felt
“competent to command a regiment, if the President, in his judgment, should he fit to intrust one
to me”107 Grant sought the rank of colonel because he believed his fifteen years of military
service, including four at West Point, gave him enough experience to command a regiment,
especially as he compared himself to those with lesser experience commanding regiments. He
wrote to Julia, “I will not go through for a position which I look upon as inferior to that of Col.
of a Regt. and will not seek that. How much soever I might deem it my duty to give my services
at this time I do not feel the obligation, at present, calls for me to accept a lower position.”108
Grant did not receive a reply on his request for a colonelcy. Luckily for Grant,
Congressman Washburne became attached to him as he admired Grant’s service in the Mexican
War and realized his potential. He was able to convince Governor Yates to name Grant a colonel.
Many of the officers of the 21st Illinois Volunteers requested Grant command the regiment as
their previous colonel had lost control of the men. Despite not wanting Pope’s aid, Grant
accepted the position and quickly recognized the lack of leadership in the regiment and instilled
discipline. It is difficult to see Grant as a man without ambition, as later critics claimed, seeking
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the rank of colonel after being out of the army for years. Still, Grant’s primary motive was a
strong sense of Union. Although he distrusted abolitionists, he knew that those in the South who
championed secession were clearly in the wrong.109
Abolition was inevitable, in Grant’s mind, from the moment the Confederate battery in
South Carolina fired on Fort Sumter. But it was to occur through events, not principle. He argued
this to his father-in-law, Col. Dent, following the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, "In all this I
can but see the doom of Slavery. The North do not want, nor will they want, to interfere with the
institution. But they will refuse for all time to give it protection unless the South shall return soon
to their allegiance..."110 He continued by arguing war "will reduce the value of the negroes so
much that they will never be worth fighting for again."111 His dislike of radicals on both sides
was reason enough to believe that Grant may have thought immediate emancipation would be
disruptive to the Union cause. Slavery might collapse as a result of war, but Grant did not feel
obligated to end it quickly as it might make reunion even more difficult. Worse, a real revolution
pitting Southern whites against slaves might erupt. His letter to his father suggests an aversion to
quick, revolutionary change as he argued quick emancipation might free slaves to "revolt and
cause more destruction than any Northern man...A Northern army be required in the next ninety
days to go south to suppress a negro insurrection."112 Grant’s approach to slavery was practical
as he believed abolition could come, but only as a necessity to Union victory.113
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With the war underway, Grant’s primary concern was ensuring his soldiers respected the
property of civilians, including slaves, which might ease reconciliation. Grant not only issued
orders that stressed strict discipline, but he also prohibited soldiers from foraging homes in
Missouri and ordered commanders to prevent random acts of destruction. His command moved
out on July 17, 1861, and the colonel ensured his men maintained strict discipline in Missouri, as
he was determined not to offend any of the residents wary of the oncoming Yankees.114 After he
was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, Grant’s command was designated to southeastern
Missouri, southern Illinois, and parts of Kentucky. However, the issue of fugitive slaves became
a pressing issue for the Union Army as the war continued. Federal policy limited war aims to
reunion only, but that did not stop General John C. Frémont, tired of seeing Union soldiers being
harassed by Confederate sympathizers, from issuing his version of an emancipation proclamation
on August 30, 1861. Frémont issued his edict as a means to “suppress disorders, to maintain, as
far as now practible, the public peace, and to give security and protection to the persons and
property of loyal citizens.” In addition to establishing martial law in the state, Frémont also
declared, “The property, real and personal, of all persons in the State of Missouri, who shall take
up arms against the United States, or who shall be directly proven to have taken active part with
their enemies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if any
they have, are hereby declared free.”115
This proclamation, while not in line with Lincoln’s policy concerning runaway slaves,
represented the growing antislavery sentiments in the North. Three weeks before Frémont issued
his proclamation, Congress passed a Confiscation Act. However, this only confiscated property
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(including slaves) used to directly aid the Southern war effort.116 William Powell, a free black
and physician in New York, maintained, “This war, disguise it as [the Federal government] may,
is virtually nothing more nor less then perpetual slavery against universal freedom, and to this
end the free States will have to come.”117 In July, the United States Marshal in Kansas, James L.
McDowell, did not deem it his duty to return slaves to Missouri until the state became “more
loyal.” United States Attorney-General, Edward Bates, responded by stressing that it was
Lincoln’s “Constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. That means all
the laws…The insurrectionary disorder in Missouri are but individual crimes, and do not change
the legal status of the state, nor change its rights and obligations as a member of the Union.”118
Grant’s approach to the war during its early stages was in stark contrast to Frémont’s and
other Northerners seeking to use the war as a means to abolish slavery. This approach was
centered on trying to keep out of the political aspect of the war. To demonstrate this version of
war aims, Grant decided to move into Kentucky. Neither side had thus far entered the state, as
both Lincoln and Confederate President Jefferson Davis did not want to force the state into the
opposite camp. Still, in order for the Union to capture the state of Tennessee, a new invasion of
Kentucky was necessary, and Frémont was preparing Grant to launch a campaign into the state.
However, Confederate General Leonidas Polk moved in first and captured Columbus,
Kentucky.119 In response to Polk, Grant crossed the Ohio River to Paducah, Kentucky on
September 6, 1861 in a move that was a defensive one, at least as far as Grant was concerned, as
he stressed his move held no political overtones. Secessionist flags were promptly taken down by
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Union soldiers, and Grant issued a proclamation that was conciliatory in tone. In his
proclamation to the citizens of Paducah, Grant declared: “I have come among you, not as an
enemy, but as your friend and fellow-citizen, not to injure or annoy you, but to respect the rights,
and to defend and enforce the rights of all loyal citizens.”120 While Grant stressed that he refused
to act with politics in mind, it cannot be ignored that events in Paducah were political. He not
only removed secessionist flags, but waited until Polk crossed into Kentucky first. By waiting,
Grant gave the impression that the Confederates were breaking Kentucky’s neutrality, and were
thus the aggressors, not the Federal Government. Nonetheless, up to this point, Grant’s view of
the war was simple: it was to be a short one that ended with the Union as it was prior to the
secession of the Confederacy. And if need be, with slavery intact. But within two weeks of
Grant’s occupation of Paducah, runaway slaves began entering his lines, seeking refuge from
their masters. Kentucky slaves knew that the presence of Union soldiers meant the disruption of
slavery, even if Union commanders, like Grant, were unwilling to abolish the institution in their
command areas.121
While Grant wished to stay away from the political aspect of the war, his proclamation
was political in nature as much as Frémont’s was. Grant’s proclamation demonstrated his goal of
fighting for reunion, not revolution, and was in line with Lincoln’s view of the war up to that
point. Lincoln reportedly liked Grant’s proclamation in Paducah. Frémont, on the other hand,
not only let his ambitions get the best of him, but he also wished to make the early stages of the
war about abolition. Frémont’s proclamation horrified Lincoln as it risked the possibility of
Kentucky leaving the Union in favor of the Confederacy. Lincoln also feared the rest Border
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States might join the Confederacy as the proclamation could be perceived as the Federal
government encroaching on the institution of slavery. Because of this fear, Lincoln swiftly
revoked Frémont’s edict. Fortunately for Lincoln, Polk’s initial invasion of Kentucky persuaded
the Bluegrass State to remain in the Union. Nonetheless, Frémont, who did not bother to discuss
such a move with the Lincoln administration, was fired and Major General Henry Halleck took
his place as Grant’s superior. Lincoln’s firing of Frémont showed that he would not allow his
generals supersede Federal policy concerning the issue of slavery.122
Despite Lincoln wanting to control Union policy on the issue of runaway slaves, his
revocation of the emancipation order stirred controversy. Robert Hamilton, a black newspaper
publisher and editor, wrote, “The reverse at Bull Run was a slight affair compared with the letter
of Abraham Lincoln which hurls back into the hell of slavery the thousands in Missouri
rightfully set free by the proclamation of Gen. Frémont.”123 Furthermore, many Republicans
began to change their minds on the subject, and abolitionists who were previously silent on the
issue began to speak out. Because Republicans and abolitionists understood racism would
prevent northerners from accepting antislavery as a war aim, the argument or antislavery took the
form of abolishing slavery as a military necessity. The fact that it was a military necessity is
problematic as it it brings into question if Northerners, including Grant, advocated for abolition
as a means to end the war, or if they did so out of human compassion. Still, slaves constituted
more than half of the Confederacy’s labor force. To take this labor force away, would help bring
the war to an end. The New York Times defended Frémont’s proclamation by arguing: “What
does it matter whether a slave bears a gun himself in the rebel Army, or stays at home and
supports his master’s family, in order that his master may be free to bear arms against the
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government? In either case it may be said the negro furnishes a recuit to the rebel army, and is
therefore employed in hostility to the Government.”124 While Lincoln abhorred slavery, he
understood that he could not issue immediate emancipation as the political ramifications might
be too great.125
Grant’s approach to the war was much in line with Lincoln’s as he kept his eyes on his
men to ensure they did not offend the civilian population and respected their property as wellbehaved soldiers disproved Southern notions about pillaging Yankees. By maintaining discipline,
Grant believed reconciliation and reunion could come easily. However Frémont’s proclamation
and General Benjamin Butler’s decision to accept runaway slaves as contraband of war, proved
that the war was taking a political turn towards abolition, even if Lincoln and Grant were slow to
come to this. Whatever Grant decided to do, free, accept slaves as contraband, or return them to
their owners, it conveyed a political statement. Ironically, secessionist slave owners and slave
holders began to demand that their property be returned from the government they were rebelling
against. Major General George B. McClellan, commander of the Union armies, instructed
Halleck to remind the citizens of Missouri and the Border States that the war was “solely for the
integrity of the Union,” and to “uphold the power of our National Government, and to restore to
the nation the blessings of peace and good order.”126 With the war quickly becoming a political
one, Halleck issued General Orders No. 3 on November 20, 1861. The orders stated, “In order to
remedy [runaway slaves entering Union lines], it is directed that no such person be hereafter
permitted to enter the lines of any camp or of any forces on the march, and that any now within
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such lines be immediately excluded therefrom.”127 It became federal policy that Army was not
waging a war for emancipation.128
Grant’s feelings towards the orders were mixed. Grant believed the war was to restore the
Union, and he held to this belief, but he was willing to accept that ending the rebellion might also
come through ending slavery. But if slavery were to come to end, it was to do so through Union
policy, not through military operations. However, noninterference with slavery was one thing,
using the Army to aid in catching slaves, and thus aiding secessionists, was another, especially as
Southerners still resisted the government. Grant did “not want the Army used as negro catchers,”
but he also did not “want to see it used as a cloak to cover their escape.”129 Following this logic,
Grant allowed a Unionist slave-owner to enter army lines to search for his slaves. A few days
later, Grant received a report from an officer in Missouri that a pro-secessionist slave-owner
entered Union lines in search of his slave. The Union commander refused the slave-owner on the
grounds that the slave was employed by the Union Army. Grant approved the commander’s
actions on the grounds that the Army should not aid a supporters of the rebellion. In comparing
the two events, Grant appeared to use, with reconciliation in mind, General Orders No. 3 as a
means to punish the disloyal and aid the loyal.130
As the war entered its second year, Grant, by this time a brigadier-general, continued to
frame orders with the Union goal of reconciliation in mind, but the scale of the war increased and
with it, so too did emancipation sentiment. But the issue of fugitive slaves became even more
pressing in 1862. In February, he began his move into Tennessee and towards Forts Henry and
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Donelson. During this operation, the general closed his lines to all civilians searching for their
slaves, yet he was willing to keep reconciliation in mind as he moved through seceded land. By
doing his best to ensure his men did not “steal” slaves, or entice them to leave their masters,
Grant ensured he did not upset the population that still held Unionist sentiments.131
After Grant’s masterful taking of Forts Henry and Donelson, General Henry Halleck
ordered Grant to use fugitive slaves taken from secessionists to work on Union fortifications. Not
only did this aid the Union Army, but Halleck also reasoned using former slaves to work on
Union fortifications hurt Confederate armies in the region as labor was taken away. Grant used
runaway slaves as teamsters in place of white soldiers and hired them to pick cotton on behalf of
the government. However, he was still apprehensive about creating his own policy on the matter
and asked Halleck for instructions, who maintained runaway slaves be used as teamsters and
cotton pickers for the government. Despite putting former slaves to work, the problem of
runaway slaves persisted as soldiers went beyond the orders given by Halleck. For instance, after
the surrender of Donelson, Grant ordered General John McClernand to put former slaves to work
on Union fortifications. One expedition went beyond the orders, as Union soldiers seized black
old men, women, and children, and the soldiers destroyed civilian property at random. This went
beyond Halleck’s orders, and he instructed his commanders, including Grant, promoted to Major
General after his victories at Henry and Donelson, to return the slaves to their owners.132 Halleck
continued to insist only civilian courts, not military ones, were empowered to rule on slavery.
Ever the dutiful soldier, Grant enforced this policy as slave owners traveled to Union camps in
search of their slaves. The image of Union soldiers returning men, women, and children back
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into bondage proved too much for Northerners and the War Department ordered commanders not
to return runaway slaves.133
Like most Northerners, and Southerners, Grant believed the war was to be short lived and
this explains his policy of reconciliation. If the war was to end quickly, it would have to do so by
restoring the Union as it was and without feelings of resentment. Whatever notions of a quick,
limited war Grant held, came to an end after the battle of Shiloh in 1862. On Sunday April 6,
Confederate columns under General Albert Sidney Johnston surprised Grant’s encamped army
near Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, or Shiloh as the Confederates named the battle. Grant pressed
General Don Carlos Buell for reinforcements following the morning’s engagement as he
believed the “appearance of fresh troops in the field…would have a powerful effect both by
inspiring our men and disheartening the enemy.”134 With reinforcements from Buell’s Army of
the Ohio, Grant drove the Confederates away the next day. The ferocity of the battle and the near
invincible nature of the Confederate will to attack changed Grant’s mind on the war. After his
successful captures of Forts Donelson and Henry in the preceding February, Grant believed the
war was at an end. After Shiloh, Grant’s view of the war shifted focus. In his Personal Memoirs
he wrote on the battle:
Up to the battle of Shiloh I, as well as other citizens, believed that the rebellion
against the Government would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory
could be gained over any of its armies. Donelson and Henry were such
victories…[After Shiloh Grant] gave up all idea of saving the Union except by
complete conquest. Up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of
that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens whose
territory was invaded…After this, however, I regarded it as humane to both sides
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to protect the persons of those found at their homes, but to consume everything
that could be used to support or supply armies…but such supplies within the
reach of Confederate armies I regarded as much as contraband as arms or
ordnance stores.135
Grant no longer felt obligated to protect the property of secessionists. Instead, his army practiced
an early concept of total warfare. This change in attitude was slower in practice then Grant
recalled in his later years, however. Nonetheless, all supplies of the land were to be consumed by
Grant’s army and he practiced this until the war’s end. This included slaves as they had been
labeled as contraband of after Benjamin Butler’s proclamation, and taking the labor force of the
South was profound blow to its war effort.
While Grant struggled with the large influx of runaway slaves entering his lines, in July
of 1862, Congress passed a second confiscation act. The act created provisions that outlined the
penalties of treason, and the punishments for those aiding the rebellion. One such penalty for
aiding the rebellion was the confiscation of all property and having it applied to support the
United States government. Included in this property, were slaves. Not only were slaves to be
confiscated, but they were to be set free by Union commanders. Additionally, the act allows the
Union government to use freed slaves to aid the Northern war effort. The New York Times
applauded this move by stating, “[Freed slaves] can save our troops an immense amount of
labor…And if they can fight, and are willing to fight against the rebels, we do not see why they
should not be able to do so.”136 By this time Lincoln, frustrated with the durability of
Confederate resistance and the failure of the Border States to adopt gradual emancipation,
completed his first draft of an emancipation proclamation.137
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Certainly Halleck was aware of the new legislation, but he failed to pass the new policy
to his subordinates, including Grant. Because of this, Grant was not aware of the new policy
concerning slaves for several weeks. Once he learned of the new policy, his headquarters issued
General Orders No. 72 on August 11, 1862. The orders created military guidelines that enforced
the new confiscation act. Runaway slaves would no longer be turned away, and instead would be
put to work. Nonetheless, the new orders were a reflection of Grant’s moderate and cautious
approach as unemployed blacks were still excluded from Union lines, and soldiers were
forbidden from enticing slaves to leave their masters. Conflicting orders, coupled with
continuing unrest amongst the civilian population, created a conflict within Grant. It now became
evident that politics and war did not exist in separate domains. Grant sought to avoid politics as
he distrusted politicians and focused solely on the military aspects of the war. In many ways,
federal policy toward fugitive slaves was tied to reconciliation and Grant practiced reconciliation
by respecting the property of secessionists in Missouri and Tennessee. Protecting the property of
the civilian population had proved to be difficult as individuals with pro-secessionist views
fought as guerrillas harassed Unionists and even Union lines. For instance the city of Memphis,
Tennessee was a hotbed for Confederate spies and disloyalty to the Union. Without instructions
from Halleck, Grant sought to try citizens charged with offenses through a military commission
as civil authority was nonexistent.138
Following a victory against Confederate forces at Corinth, Mississippi in October of
1862, Grant’s men continued to struggle with the large influx of black refugees. Runaway slaves
near Corinth obstructed Union fortifications and began to cause health issues. Initially, Grant
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tried to put black men to work on fortifications at Corinth, Tennessee and he sent the women and
children to camps east of that location. But with runaway slaves entering Union lines by the
hundreds, Grant then placed Chaplain John C. Eaton, of the Twenty-seventh Ohio Regiment in
charge of a program to transition freed blacks into freedom at Grand Junction, Tennessee.139
Initially Eaton was reluctant to head the program, but was impressed with it after learning that
the program established refugee camps for blacks as they lived off the land and worked for their
own wages, all under Union supervision. The program not only paid the runaway slaves for the
first time in their lives, but it also provided them with rations and medical care. With the use of
escaped enslaved blacks as laborers for his army, Grant believed the hard work done by blacks
dispelled the notion that they were lazy and irresponsible.140
While this cautionary approach on the part of Grant appears paternalistic, having worked
with black labors in Missouri prior the war may have lead him to conclude that with the proper
assistance, freed blacks were fully capable of working and providing for themselves. He also
may have believed that once blacks were seen working with the army, this might disprove racist
prejudices and show whites that freed slaves can partake in fighting for their freedom as well. If
this was Grant’s thinking, and it appears to be the case based on his correspondence, this reflects
Grant’s future policy on Reconstruction, which is that white racism must be overcome in order
for full racial equality to be established. As discussed this thinking does have aspects of
paternalism as Grant sought a transition to freedom for freed blacks, but it aided formers slaves
by ensuring they had assistance, and it aided his army as well. Grant’s thinking may have been
void of progressive, revolutionary change, but it was representative of change through order.
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Grant’s plan bore resemblance to other plans enacted by other Union commanders. In South
Carolina, Louisiana, and Virginia, commanders put former slaves to work on plantations, in most
instances for wages, run by whites. Additionally, the American Missionary Association
established communities on in the Sea Islands in South Carolina that aided former slaves.
Grant’s plan may not have been original or revolutionary, but it represented the first time he
acted without waiting for orders or administrative policy on the matter. 141
As Grant continued fight out West, Confederate General Robert E. Lee pushed into
Maryland in 1862 with the intentions of rallying pro-secessionists and pushing the Border States
into joining the Confederate cause. On September 17, 1862, General George B. McClellan’s
Army of the Potomac met Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia near Antietam Creek. The battle
ended in a draw, and much to Lincoln’s dismay, McClellan allowed Lee’s outnumbered army to
slip back into Virginia. McClellan refused to move, but Lincoln used the battle to issue his
Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862. With the Emancipation Proclamation,
President Lincoln shaped the war as one for freedom as freed slaves could now fight for their
freedom as soldiers in the Union Army. The final draft of the proclamation declared that all able
bodied black males are to be "received into the armed service of the United States to garrison
forts, positions, stations...and to man vessels of all sorts in said service."142 Lincoln further
maintained that the "colored population is the great avaliable and yet unavailed of, force for
restoring the Union. The bare sight of fifty thousand armed, and drilled black soldiers on the
banks of the Mississippi, would end the rebellion at once."143 Reaction amongst Grant's men and
officers was mixed, but he supported the measure. General William T. Sherman, serving under
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Grant, held mixed feelings on the use of black soldiers, writing they should be used for “some
side purpose & not be brigaded with our white men.”144 Sherman further argued to his brother,
John Sherman, the use of freed slave as teamsters was not useful as they ran away the moment
danger was present, he contended that his men wished to be rid of black workers. Yet, Sherman
saw the military usefulness of black soldiers as he wrote John, “I wont trust niggers to fight yet,
but don’t object to the Government taking them from the enemy, & making such use of them as
experience may suggest.”145 Horace Porter who served on Grant’s staff, later reflected on
Lincoln’s calling for black soldiers: “When we wanted every able-bodied man who could be
spared to go to the front, and my opposers kept objecting to the negroes, I used to tell them that
at such times it was just as well to be a little color blind.”146 Lincoln hoped the use of black
soldiers might “soon close the contest,” and Grant supported the use of black soldiers as
“emancipation of the negro, is the heavyest blow yet given to the Confederacy” 147
As the war entered 1863, Grant set his sights on laying siege and taking Vicksburg,
Mississippi. He directed Eaton to use black laborers to work on canal initiatives, not only did this
free his men from these laborious tasks, but it also put refugee blacks to work. However,
refugees continued to flood Grant's lines and the large presence of noncombatants disrupted the
military operations in the area. On February 12, 1863, Grant issued Special Field orders No. 2, in
which it was ordered that soldiers to stop "enticing" slaves to leave their plantations and enter
Union lines as it was “impractible to transport or provide for persons unemployed by [the]
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Government.”148 Grant defended the orders to Halleck by insisting that “humanity dictates this
policy.”149 The Army was simply not equipped to handle large influxes of refugees. Naturally,
antislavery advocates argued that Grant's order was a symbol of the Army's refusal to aid
runaway slaves.150 But the criticism directed towards Grant was unfair as it was surely difficult
to wage a large military campaign and handle a large population movement at the same time,
especially as Grant remained bogged down at Vicksburg.
As spring began, Grant’s situation at Vicksburg remained unchanged. High water levels
obstructed movement, as did the slow progress of digging canals to help move the army. In
addition to having to manage the military aspect of the campaign, Grant came under scrutiny as
his campaign remained at a standstill. Grant developed a rivalry with General John McClernand,
a close friend of Lincoln. McClernand was able to use his political influence to secure a
command independent of Grant’s, his superior officer, and was authorized by Secretary of War
William Stanton to launch an expedition against Vicksburg. Because Grant was successful in
ensuring McClernand did not overtake the Vicksburg campaign, McClernand spread rumors
about Grant’s drinking. For two months, Grant’s army was stuck in the mud and Vicksburg stood
defiant, and his drinking habits became the reasoning for the inability to make progress. Other
generals under Grant’s command followed McClernand’s lead and charged Grant of being drunk
while on duty. General Charles S. Hamilton insisted to Senator James Doolittle of Wisconsin that
Grant tried “to let liquor alone --- but he cannot resist the temptation always.”151
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Northern newspapers began circulating the rumors, and often created stories, about
Grant’s drunkenness. Surely the charges, especially those made by McClernand, were politically
charged and fueled by jealousy as Grant obtained levels of success, but there were instances in
which Grant fell off the wagon. There was excessive drinking at Grant’s headquarters, and
Grant’s Chief-of-Staff, John Rawlins, did his best to ensure the general did not take to the bottle.
During the Vicksburg Campaign, Grant was prone to migraine headaches due to high volumes of
stress and lack of sleep. Because of this, he at times acted in a manner that gave observers he was
drunk. Of course, Grant did struggle with alcohol. He was a binge drinker who could lay off
liquor for months, only to fall back to old habits, a sign of modern day alcoholism. Despite the
charges, Lincoln still had faith in Grant, and he deflected the charges levied against the general.
But with progress nowhere to be found and the rumors growing in volume, Grant permitted
Stanton to send a special agent, Charles A. Dana, former managing editor of the New York
Tribune, to investigate the Army of the Tennessee in March of 1863. While the rumors about
Grant and lack of progress at Vicksburg were to be investigated by Dana, he was also tasked
with investigating the conservative approach on emancipation on the parts of Halleck and
Grant.152
Dana and Grant had previously met, but Grant and his officers quickly realized Dana’s
mission was to investigate the Army for the Federal government. Rather than treating Dana as a
threat, Grant and his staff turned the visit into an opportunity. Rawlins and the inspector general,
John H. Wilson welcomed the visitor. Grant himself received Dana warmly and shared with him
his plan to take the city of Vicksburg. Not only did this flatter Dana, but he became a staunch
supporter of Grant. Likewise, he shared Grant’s suspicions of McClernand and his lack of
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military abilities. Along with Dana, Lincoln and Stanton sent Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas,
who was tasked with reminding Grant of federal policy towards emancipated slaves. With the
Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln decided to change the war into one that included black
soldiers. Grant and Halleck had taken a conservative approach towards runaway slaves thus far,
as evident with Halleck’s General Orders No. 3 in 1861. Halleck alerted Grant to the new
approach, “It is the policy of the Government to withdraw from the enemy as much labor as
possible. So long as the rebels retain and employ their slaves…they can employ all whites in the
field. Every slave withdrawn from the enemy is equivalent to a white man hors de combat.”
Halleck continued, “Again, it is the policy of the Government to use negroes of the South, as far
as practicable, as a military force, for the defense of forts, depots, &c.” Not only did Halleck
stress the benefits of using former slaves for the Union Army, but he warned Grant of his officers
hostile to the idea. Regarding such hostility and the returning of slaves as not only “bad policy in
itself,” but “directly opposed to the policy adopted by the Government.” Previously conservative
regarding policy on slavery, Halleck recognized the shift in the war and instructed Grant to
remove any prejudices his men may have.153
Grant took Halleck’s advice and prepared for Thomas by recognizing the changing nature
of the war. He offered Thomas every assistance, and sent orders to officers that reminded them
of federal policy. For instance, Grant instructed General Fredrick Steele to encourage former
slaves into Union lines, especially “middle-aged males,” and to provide for them once they have
done so. He wrote to Steele, “[The] rebellion has assumed that shape now that it can only
terminate by the complete subjugation of the South…It is our duty, therefore, to use every means
to weaken the enemy, by destroying their means of subsistence, withdrawing their means of
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cultivating their fields, and in every other way possible.”154 Furthermore, he approved of General
Stephen A. Hurlbut’s request to use runaway slaves as teamsters. When officers disagreed with
Grant by threatening resignation, Grant recommended their dismissal from the Army. Soldiers
are to obey all orders, regardless of personal opinions, and this was Grant’s steadfast belief.
Grant not only impressed Thomas, thus removing him as a threat, but he recognized black
soldiers and labors would increase his ranks. His white soldiers could be removed from laborious
duty, and black soldiers could fill up depleted ranks when ready for combat.155
As he continued his campaign against General John Pemberton's Confederate forces at
Vicksburg, Grant learned of black recruits engaged in their first battle at Milliken's Bend, near
Vicksburg. Because the soldiers had but few days of military training they initially gave way to
the Confederates. After vicious hand-to-hand combat, the Twenty-Third Iowa Volunteers and the
African Brigade, with the aid of Admiral David Porter’s gunboat the Choctaw, were able to push
the Confederates into a retreat.156 Grant reported to Thomas, that despite their inexperience,
“Their conduct is said, however, to have been most gallant, and I doubt not but with good
officers they will make good troops.”157 The engagement dispelled at least some prejudices
against black soldiers as it proved they could indeed fight.
But the Union victory was overshadowed by reports of Confederates murdering black
soldiers during the Union soldiers' initial retreat. Days after the battle, further reports reached
Grant through Admiral Porter detailing the killings of black soldiers at Milliken's Bend, in which
he described to Grant said soldiers were lined in a ditch with gunshots at the top of their heads.158
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Additionally, Grant reported to Confederate General Richard Taylor that a white captain and
black soldiers were hung following the battle. While Grant acknowledged the Confederates
fought the battle under the policy of “black flag of no quarter,” he felt “no inclination to retaliate
for the offenses of irresponsible persons...” Yet he reminded Taylor, “colored troops are
regularly mustered into the service of the United States. The Government and all officers serving
under the Government are bound to give the same protection to these troops that they do any
other troops.”159
Taylor denied the reports and labeled the hangings as “fabrication.” While he denied the
hangings and promised to investigate the matter, Taylor asserted to Grant that it is the policy of
Confederate government that captured black soldiers were to be turned over to civil authorities
and were subjected to punishment based on the states’ laws they were captured in.160 Taylor
continued to deny the reports after Grant accepted Confederate General John C. Pemberton's
surrender of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. Because Grant greatly disliked the Confederate policy of
returning captured black soldiers to the plantation fields, he refused the demands of paroled
Confederate prisoners to have their slaves returned. Grant acknowledged that he could not hold
freed slaves against their will in Union lines. But, he wanted former slaves to “understand they
are free men,” and if “they are then anxious to go with their masters, I do not see the necessity of
preventing it.” In fact, Grant hoped those that did return to the masters might spread
dissatisfaction “among the negroes at a distance by telling that the Yankees set them all free.”161
It is unlikely Confederate government’s policy towards black soldiers was a surprise to Union
officials as it was established in 1862. But before Milliken’s Bend, its application was limited, if
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not rare. When discussing the full-scale enlistment of black soldiers in January 1863, Lincoln
suggested to Stanton and Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles that black soldiers be used in areas
“where they would not be liable to be captured.”162 Because of the reports of the murdering black
soldiers, Grant preferred to use black soldiers as guards behind Union lines.163
After the battle, Grant issued General Order No. 51, in which his department was to
establish camps for former slaves that are not employed by the government those that were
needed were to continue to be employed. Citizens within the department were allowed to make
contracts with formers slaves to work on plantations, but they were to be paid through either
monthly wages, or through food and other rations.164 Not only did this show that Grant was a
firm supporter of the administration’s policy, but it helped Grant gain more favor from Lincoln.
Lincoln wrote to Grant after Vicksburg, that the use of black soldiers, "is a resource which, if
applied now, will soon close the contest. It works doubly, weakening the enemy and
strengthening us."165 Grant's victory at Vicksburg coupled with Union General George Meade's
victory over Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg, began to turn the tide for the Union. After the horrific
battle with Lee in which the dead, wounded, and missing count reached nearly fifty thousand in
three days, Meade refused to launch a counterattack against Lee and potentially win the war.
Lincoln’s need for a fighting general continued to grow. Grant's support of Lincoln's policy on
the use of black soldiers not only demonstrated that Grant believed emancipation was
intertwined with restoring the Union, but he also gained more fame after his victory ar
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Chattanooga, Tennessee. When Congress convened, Elhiu Washburne introduced a bill
authorizing Lincoln to revive the rank of Lieutenant-General, previously held by George
Washington, all in Congress understood Grant to be the sole candidate for the promotion. His
willingness to fight and victories left no doubt in the minds of those in Congress. The bill passed
on February 29 and President Lincoln presented Grant with his commission as LieutenantGeneral and commander of all Union armies on March 10, 1864.166
When Grant assumed command with the Army of the Potomac, he set his sights on Lee.
As he planned his campaign against Lee, he did not confide his plans with Lincoln, and the
president was content with this. Lincoln held full confidence in Grant, and wrote to him: “The
particulars of your plan I neither know, or seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and,
pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you.”167 Grant’s plan
was to concentrate all forces as a single unit and crush the Confederate armies in the field.168
As Lieutenant-General, Grant began his 1864 offensives against Confederate General
Robert E. Lee, his sole objective for the Army of the Potomac. Grant recognized he needed
manpower to overwhelm Lee, and this called for a greater use of black soldiers. For his
campaign against Lee to work, Grant recognized the need to raise more black regiments. Not
only would this free white soldiers from garrison and chore duties, but black soldiers could
potentially participate in larger scale assaults along their white counterparts. With the guidance
of white officers, Grant still believed black soldiers could reverse prejudices held against them.
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This is not to suggest Grant viewed the use of black soldiers solely as an increase in manpower,
he continued to protest the ill treatment of black prisoners by the Confederates. Whether his
concern for them was due to their military necessity or over the welfare of his soldiers, Grant’s,
and even Lincoln’s, response to the ill treatment of black soldiers does suggest that the General
may have cared about his men. The “massacre” at Fort Pillow is the most notable instance in
which black soldiers were murdered after they surrendered to Confederate force. The
Confederate government never endorsed the killing of black prisoners, but many Confederate
soldier and officers refused to recognize blacks as their equal on the battlefield. Historians
question the validity of the Congressional Committee that investigated the incident as it has
several distortion sand exaggerations, but it is agreed upon that black soldiers were killed on
April 12, 1864 at Fort Pillow. After Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forest allowed his men
to massacre 300 black Union prisoners at Fort Pillow, Grant wrote Sherman, “If our men have
been murdered after capture, retaliation must be resorted to promptly.” 169
It is unclear what sort of retaliation Grant was referring to, but this hardline view was not
one that the Lincoln administration held as it decried any form of retaliation. Sherman, in a letter
to his brother, did not seem surprised by the incident and believed prisoner exchanges should be
halted as he argued: “I feel certain the war will soon become barbarous, but it is inevitable.
Prisoners should not be exchanged.”170 Sherman wrote to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton that
the soldiers affected by the incident should “make their Rules as we progress,” and that the
Southern Army will “heed the Slaughter that will follow as the natural consequence of their own
inhuman acts.”171 Lincoln and his cabinet also opposed any form of retaliation against the
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Confederates. Lincoln did, however, argue that “having determined to use the negro as a soldier,
there is no way but to give him all the protection given to any other soldier. The difficulty is not
in stating the principle, but in practically applying it.”172 Lincoln and his cabinet did consider
retaliation that ranged from executing Forest and other officers and soldiers responsible to
randomly executing Confederate prisoners, but ultimately decided against these measures.
Furthermore, the incident at Fort Pillow contributed to Grant’s supporting of the Lincoln
administration’s decision to cease prisoner exchanges. He decided that no more Confederate
prisoners were to be exchanged until the South met the quota of 30,000 prisoners it owed the
North. Additionally, Grant insisted that black soldiers be treated as white soldiers were treated.173
As Grant continued his Overland Campaign against Lee, he was forced to reconsider his
strategy against his Confederate counterpart. Battles such as the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and
Cold Harbor resulted in massive loss of life for both sides. Ever persistent, Grant pressed on
against Lee. While he suffered high casualties, Grant had the backing of Northern manpower to
refill his depleted ranks; Lee did not have such a luxury. Since the beginning of his campaign
progress was slow and Grant lost nearly sixty thousand men, killed, wounded, and missing, and
Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia still had considerable fight left in it. Determined to remove his
army from its close quarters combat against Lee, Grant moved south and crossed the James River
and pinned Lee against Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy, and its supply city,
Petersburg. Grant reasoned that if he could take Petersburg and seize its rail lines, Richmond
could then be captured. Grant stressed the importance of seizing Petersburg in his memoirs as,
“its loss would be the loss of the cause.”174 The assaults on Lee’s lines failed to yield any results
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and by June 1864, Grant extended his lines, decided to avoid frontal assaults, and moved towards
Richmond’s remaining rail lines. After these moves, Grant was prepared to lay siege to
Petersburg. However, the inaction of a siege was not in Grant’s nature and once underway, the
general was constantly looking for ways to break Lee’s lines. Hope came in the form Army of
the Potomac General Ambrose E. Burnside as he was given a plan to take the city by LieutenantColonel Henry Pleasants, Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers. Under Pleasants’plan, members
of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, which consisted miners from western Pennsylvania, were to
dig beneath the Confederate trenches and blow a large hole in the line in which Burnside would
then assault the confused rebels. Grant, who endorsed similar tactics at Vicksburg, approved the
plan and the Pennsylvanians burrowed beneath Lee’s lines a tunnel five-hundred and eleven feet
long in which they stacked eight thousand pounds of gunpowder.175
Burnside designated a fresh division to lead the assault led by Brigadier-General Edward
Ferrero, whose division consisted of an all-black unit. Because Ferrero’s men had not seen
combat due to being tasked with guarding rear-area supplies, the soldiers received special
training for their mission. The mine was to be exploded by Pleasants at 3:30 a.m., followed by
the initial assault, on July 30, 1864. However, less then twenty-four hours before the mine was to
be exploded, Meade sent word to Burnside stating that black soldiers were not to be used. Meade
had no confidence in the black soldiers and argued Ferrero’s men were too green. Grant later
testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that if the assault failed, blame did not
want to be on the Army for the purposeful misuse of black soldiers. Meade did not tell Grant
about his lack of confidence and as Burnside pleaded with Meade to allow his men to be used.
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But it was to no avail, as the commander to lead the assault was selected through the use of
drawing straws. Grant approved the plan and the assault took place with white soldiers leading
the charge.176
The explosion blew a hole 170 feet long, 60 feet wide, and 30 feet deep. One Confederate
regiment was buried in the debris and those close to the explosion fled. Union soldiers poured
into the crater, rather than around, and Confederate soldiers fired in the chaotic crater.
Confederate soldiers became outraged at the sight of black soldiers in Union blue and murdered
any who surrendered, while white soldiers were taken prisoner. Lee, universally thought to be
the epitome of a Southern gentlemen, did nothing to stop the murders. Grant protested this foul
treatment, but Lee refused to recognize black Union soldiers as prisoners of war. Grant did offer
a form of retaliation after assaults along the lines at Richmond, in which black soldiers
participated, Lee inquired Grant on exchanging prisoners. Grant agreed, but limited to the
exchange of prisoners that participated in the latest engagement. Lee agreed to exchange any
Union prisoner no matter their color, but black soldiers belonging to citizens of the Confederacy
were not to be exchanged. Ironically, Lee began using captured black Union soldiers as laborers
on fortification within range of Union fire. Grant retaliated by allowing General Benjamin Butler
to use Confederate prisoners on Union fortifications. Eventually, Lee backed down. Grant
continued to argue to Lee that it was his duty to protect all United States soldiers, no matter their
race or nationality.177
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As the war entered the year 1865, victory seemed within reach for Lincoln. Grant let
General William T. Sherman loose throughout Georgia and the Carolinas in his famous, or
infamous, March to the Sea. Sherman was unapologetic for path of destruction laid by his army.
While in Georgia, Sherman wrote to Halleck that if the people of the South, “raise a howl against
my barbarity & cruelty, I will answer that War is War & not popularity seeking. If they want
Peace, they & their relations must stop War.”178 On March 2, 1865, Lee informed Grant he was
willing to enter negotiations. As the war continued, Grant let General Philip Sheridan loose in
Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley in last assault to cut Lee’s supply line. Like Sherman, Sheridan
laid waste to the valley and dealt a devastating blow to the Confederacy by achieving victory at
Five Forks, and on April 2, Petersburg finally fell. Unable to sustain his position, Lee abandoned
Richmond a day later.
By April 6, 1865, Lee found himself trapped between Appomattox Court House and the
James River. Sheridan cut off the last rail lines by capturing Appomattox Station, along with
much needed rations. After a series of correspondence, Grant and Lee decided to meet at the
home of Wilmer McClean in Appomattox Court House. In keeping with his prewar view of
reconciliation, Grant assumed a statesman role at Appomattox by ensuring the terms proposed to
Lee demonstrated that Southerners were not a foreign enemy, but fellow countrymen. With these
terms given to Lee, Grant practiced a policy of reconciliation that offered no feelings of
animosity. In the terms of surrender, Lee’s men were to be paroled, Confederate officers could
keep their small arms, and all took an oath to not take up arms against the United States again.
Additionally, Grant allowed men with horses to keep them for their farms. Finally, he ordered
rations to be given to Lee’s starving men. After Lee’s surrender, men of the Army of the
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Potomac began cheering, but in a feeling of reconciliation, Grant stopped it, as he later
explained, “The Confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their
downfall.”179
With Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865 and Lincoln’s
assassination five days later, Grant shifted his focus towards reconstruction. Grant carried
Lincoln’s policy of reconciliation as the phase of Reconstruction began under President Andrew
Johnson.180 Since the start of the war, and even in later interviews and writings on the war, Grant
maintained that soldiers should keep their political opinions to themselves. When political and
military matters crossed each other, Grant asked for instructions, as was the case with runaway
slaves entering his lines. He was slow to accept black soldiers, but nonetheless supported Lincoln
and this measure as emancipation was a powerful military tool. But with the protection and use
of black soldiers, Grant was expressing political opinions. This only happened as he rose in rank,
it can be argued, but it was clear he no longer felt reluctant to hide his political opinions.
Viewing freed slaves as potential manpower is one thing, but arguing for their defense as
prisoners of war suggests that cared for them as he would his white soldiers. With the war over
and the process of reconstruction following, the lines between politics and war were to become
further blurred and Grant was able to grasp this.
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CHAPTER V
RECONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT
French aristocrat and political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville, in his Democracy in
America, foresaw the difficulty of achieving social equality among races. He argued that,
although slaves could be set free, they will never achieve full equality in America. This
observation by Tocqueville, made during his travels in America in the early 1830s, was precise
as the theme of racial inequality has dominated American history. Thus Tocqueville pointed to
an insoluble problem: only white Americans can enjoy liberty while blacks, because of their
status as slaves, are held in a state of inequality. As long as slavery existed, full equality in could
not exist in America, Tocqueville reasoned, as prejudices against black individuals would
continue to exist, especially in the laws. Tocqueville certainly held a pessimistic view on the
subject as he believed white Americans would continue to hold biases towards the people they
held in bondage for centuries. Tocqueville came to this conclusion, as he reasoned, “[freed
slaves] come up against the tyranny of the laws and the intolerance of mores… have the
remembrance of slavery [working] against them, and they cannot claim the possession of a single
spot on the soil…”181
Furthermore, he expected slavery to come to an end but the contradiction of inequality in
American law to always exist. Racial attitudes will forever ensure black individuals are kept in
an inferior position, and in 1831 Tocqueville was correct. A slave may be free, but he could
never enjoy the same rights as white men in both the North and the South.Tocqueville explained
these conditions, “There is a natural prejudice that brings man to scorn whoever has been his
inferior, for a long time after he has become his equal; an imaginary inequality that has its roots
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in mores always follows upon the real inequality that fortune or law produces…”182 On legal
inequality, Tocqueville noted, “Thus in the United States the prejudice that repels Negroes seems
to grow as Negroes cease to be slaves, and inequality is engraved in mores in the same measure
as it is effaced on the laws.”183 After abolishing slavery, Tocqueville contended three prejudices
must be eradicated: those of race, the former master, and of whites. To Tocqueville, this was a
difficult task within a society where legal inequality existed. 184 On whether whites and blacks
could erase the tension of racial prejudice, Tocqueville explained, “The modern slave differs
from the master not only by freedom, but also by origin. You can make the Negro free, but you
cannot do it so that he is not in the position of a stranger vis-à-vis the European.”185
It is this social inequality that Grant, as both a general in the United States Army and
president, believed threatened the gains made by the Union during the Civil War. Furthermore,
in order to end legal inequality, Grant and the Republican Party faced Southerners that were
discriminating, and even murdering, individuals seeking to settle in a new social order. Racial
upheaval provided a complex situation for Grant and Congressional Republicans. In order to
understand Reconstruction policy, it is necessary to recognize that American after the Civil War
tried to resolve the issue of how best to reunite the country while defining what freedom meant
for freed blacks. This is a key policy issue for both Lincoln and Grant, as well as the Republicans
in Congress. Lincoln sought to secure emancipation through constitutional means, and expanded
the powers of the executive to do so. Grant not only tried to use same approach, but was also
tasked with enforcing federal policy. Throughout the war, it has been argued Grant’s views on
freedom for blacks evolved. He entered the war seeking to fight for the Union with reconciliation
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amongst the two sections, he moved to a position in which he accepted emancipation as a crucial
component to Union victory. As Grant rose to command all Union armies, he was forced to
integrate the political aspects of the war into his military polices. He did so, with a seemingly
moderate approach, pushing for reconciliation while ensuring violence and discrimination
against freed blacks did not cause a social revolution in the South, thus forcing the nation to fight
itself once more. Grant reacted to events in the South as they took shape, seeking to establish a
balance between social change and social order.
Because Grant was not one to speak his mind openly, if he did so at all, he remains a
puzzle. While reconciliation was Grant’s moral principal during Reconstruction—something he
stressed this upon his election in 1868—he adopted the military as an instrument of enforcing
federal policy. Grant may not have pursed any one policy single-mindedly, the use of the
military remained central to his decision making, even as the nation grew weary of the violence.
Despite the fact that there is no evidence to suggest Grant sought to become a military despot,
this is arguably a radical approach as the nation was technically no longer at war after the peace
signing at Appomattox in 1865. Nonetheless, Grant moved from an indifference towards slavery
prior to the war, to wanting to protect the rights of black Americans as president during
Reconstruction. Grant reacted to events as they took shape, seeking to establish a balance
between social change and social order. Whatever threatened this balance attracted his attention
and drew a response. As General of the Army of the United States Grant was willing to use the
Army to suppress violence in the South and he used the same force as President of the United
States. The war officially came to an end as Grant accepted Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s
surrender Appomattox on April 9, 1865. He believed Reconstruction, under the direction of
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President Andrew Johnson after Lincoln’s assassination, and the war were part of the same
struggle to preserve the Union, stamp out slavery, and finally establish a lasting peace.
Lincoln began an initial form of reconstruction in the states of Arkansas, Tennessee, and
Louisiana as early as 1862. He appointed military governors in the portions of these states that
were under Union control, and he authorized them to reestablish civil governments. Military
campaigns in the regions postponed Lincoln’s plans to establish unionist governments in these
states, but with the Union capture of Port Hudson, the expulsion of Confederate forces at Little
Rock, and Confederate General Braxton Bragg’s retreat from Tennessee by 1863, Lincoln
pushed the territories to establish civil governments. Lincoln, however, believed the state of
Louisiana to provide the best prospect for his Reconstruction polices. Many wealthy sugar and
cotton planters in the bayous were former Whigs and remained loyal to the Union, if only to be
allowed to sell their cotton with the federal government’s consent. Union forces occupied the
state since the spring of 1862, and were commanded by Republican General Nathaniel Banks
and George F. Shepley, a radical Republican. With these political generals, Lincoln could move
forward with his policies in the state. While progress was slow in Louisiana, Lincoln nonetheless
introduced his ten percent plan during the winter of 1863.The plan decreed that a state could be
readmitted into the Union when ten percent of the 1860 voting population took the oath of
allegiance and so long as the legislature accepted emancipation. The issue of black suffrage
became part of the loyalty debate as Radicals insisted white Unionists and former slaves never
fully supported the rebellion. Lincoln and moderate Republicans, on the other hand, wished to
include whites who renounced their allegiance to the Confederacy.186
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In a conciliatory tone, Lincoln granted amnesty to these whites as he issued his
Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction. The proclamation granted amnesty through the
taking of an oath to the United States, to any person not of a high Confederate government post
or holding high military rank. The proclamation was part of Lincoln’s theory that secession was
illegal, and therefore the states in rebellion never left the Union. The task of Reconstruction,
then, was to return “loyal” officials to power. A few radicals, such as Thaddeus Stevens,
subscribed to the belief the states in rebellion not only left the Union, but ceased to exist as legal
states, and when invaded by the Union armies became conquered provinces, subject to the
conqueror’s will. However, most Republicans were not willing to adopt this view, including
Lincoln. Instead, party members argued that the southern states in rebellion attempted the
treasonable act of secession, and therefore reverted to territorial status as they lost their rights as
states. Despite this proclamation, Radicals were adamant about not allowing recanting whites to
vote if freed blacks could not, at least not until the war was over and danger of rebellion was
over.187
By July 1864, Republican Senators Benjamin F. Wade and Henry Davis cosponsored a
new bill that attracted majority support. Republicans had to make several sacrifices to gain
support, including dropping black suffrage, but the plan was at odds with the President’s Ten
Percent Plan. In short, the bill made the re-admittance to the Union for former Confederate states
dependent on a majority in each state to take the an oath that decreed that effect they had never
in the supported the Confederacy. Once this majority was achieved, the military governor,
appointed by the president, could hold a statewide election to reestablish the state government,
which only allowed whites with Unionists sympathies to vote. The members under the new

187

Brooks D. Simpson, The Reconstruction Presidents (Lawrence, 1998), 49.; McPherson, Battle Cry of
Freedom, 699, 701, 708.

95
government then had to amend the state constitution to repudiate the Confederate debt, abolish
slavery, and disallow prominent Confederates from voting. The bill passed both houses of
Congress in July1864, after it dropped the mandate to abolish slavery. The bill, however, could
not achieve a majority in the House without doing so, and making it a prerequisite for
readmission. Yet, the bill was it was pocket vetoed by Lincoln. The Radicals were outraged that
Lincoln did not sign the bill as the President adhered to his ten percent plan. Lincoln also
disapproved of emancipation prerequisite, as he argued abolition could only be enforced through
justifying it as a war measure. Southern whites must voluntarily abandon the institution, and
through a constitutional amendment. Any other approach would simply be struck down by the
Supreme Court, Lincoln reasoned.188
While Lincoln wanted a peaceful reunion, most Republicans in Congress believed the
only way to maintain the achievements of Union victory was to change Southern society,
particularly, race relations in the South. Upon Lincoln's death Andrew Johnson assumed the
presidency, and initially followed the outline of Lincoln's reconciliation policy. Johnson took
Reconstruction to mean the return of loyal whites and punishment of the secessionist leadership
that led them into treason. The president swore vengeance against secessionists, proclaiming,
“Treason must be made odious, and traitors must be punished and impoverished.” He further
contended that “their great plantations must be seized and divided into small farms, and sold to
honest, industrious men.” As for the leaders of the rebellion, Johnson provided harsher terms:
“the instigators, the conscious intelligent traitors, they ought to be hung.”189 Johnson even felt
that Grant was too generous in the terms given to Lee at Appomattox. Grant admitted, during his
testimony during Johnson’s impeachment trial that he “frequently had to intercede for General
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Lee and other paroled officers, on the ground that their parole, so long as they obeyed the laws of
the United States, protected them from arrest.” Continuing, Grant revealed Johnson’s views as,
“the President at the time occupied exactly the reverse ground, viz: that they should be tried and
punished.”190 Grant would not consider arresting Lee or any soldier so long as they accepted the
laws of the United States, as doing so would destroy any attempt at reconciliation with the South.
But, such firm, robust language seemed to confirm Johnson’s radical credentials to the
Republicans in Congress. Despite Johnson’s views on the Appomattox peace terms, Grant
believed he could work with the new president. Despite the hardline tone directed towards
former Confederate officials and members of the plantation aristocracy, Johnson adopted a plan
for Reconstruction in the summer of 1865 that called for states to reorganize governments based
on prewar voting requirements. Under this plan, voting was limited to whites, and vast majority
of this population were men who had been supporters of the Confederacy. Because these
supporters were given political power, Southern Unionists were excluded from the political
process and took their complaints to Congress as they faced harassment at the ballot box.
Freedmen, by the same token, were barred from exercising their voting rights as the newly
created governments quickly established discriminatory Black Codes. With this plan, Johnson set
himself apart from Congressional Republicans as, unlike Lincoln, Johnson proved unwilling to
work with the Republicans as they tried to frame reconstruction policy. This move came
represented a complete turnaround for Johnson, as his first proclamation of amnesty excluded all
the political and military leaders, including generals, of the Confederacy, as well as Confederate
supporters worth over twenty-thousand dollars.191 Again, Grant disagreed with Johnson on this,
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as he reasoned, “I could not see any reason why the fact of a volunteer rising to the rank of
general should exclude him any more than any other grade; and with reference to the $20,000
clause, I thought that a man’s success in this world was no reason for his being excluded from
amnesty.…” However, Grant did not give his opinions, unless asked. Grant maintained, “When I
was asked my opinion about what has been done, I was willing to give it. I originated no plan,
and suggested no plan for civil government. I only gave my views on measures after they had
been originated.” 192 Grant agreed with Johnson that a swift peace was needed, but disagreed on
the approach. Although he distrusted Johnson, Grant maintained his role as a general subordinate
to the president and kept his views private.
The shift on the part of Johnson and his refusal to work with Congressional Republicans
throughout Reconstruction, can be explained based on his political background. Prior to the war,
Johnson held a states’ rights, strict constructionist view. His slight turn towards radicalism
during the war, can therefore be interpreted as a temporary position as he sought to maintain the
promise of a future career as he gave his support to the Lincoln Administration and the Union
war effort. After the war, with the presidency under his control and the political power to shape
Southern politics, Johnson reverted back to his philosophy of conservatism and strict
constitutionalism. By 1866, he embraced this position as he openly agreed with the Democrats
who argued the extreme wing of the Republican Party was not only revolutionary, but to blame
for the South seceding. Because of his states’ rights views, Democrats courted Johnson. In spite
of his political views, Radicals still persisted in believing Johnson would adopt the Radical
platform: the punishment of traitors and the enfranchisement of freed individuals. But, Johnson’s
approach for Reconstruction was based on a lenient peace and a quick restoration of the former
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Confederacy. He continued to entertain the notion of punishing Confederate officials, but Grant
insisted Robert E. Lee not be tried for treason as this might lead to feelings of hostility on the
part of Southerners. In addition, Johnson did not seek a full restructuring of Southern society,
instead he opted for a limited one as he did not entertain the thought of a social revolution
occurring in the South. In fact, Johnson did not care for the term “reconstruction,” as it implied
transforming the relationship between the South and the rest of the Union. Furthermore, his
policy toward the freedmen was still unclear. While in public he claimed to care for freed
persons, Johnson held deep prejudices against blacks. Johnson believed only southern whites, not
northern whites, knew what was best for the former slaves. In his mind, blacks were lazy, and
had to learn that freedom meant work, not waiting for government handouts. During his time in
office, he insisted that white southerners meet certain requirements for state restoration, black
suffrage, however, was not one of them.193
In his 1867 annual message to Congress, Johnson insisted that blacks possessed less
“capacity for government than any other race of people. No independent government of any form
has ever been successful in their hands.”194 Like other Southern yeoman, Johnson, born into
poverty in Raleigh, North Carolina, believed that slaves had in some form joined forces with
their owners in order to oppress nonslaveholding whites. Freed slaves, Johnson asserted,
identified with their former masters’ views and looked down on the poor white population. Upon
Lincoln’s assassination, Grant felt uneasy at the change in the executive office, as Johnson
initially entered the office seeking a harsh peace. But after conferring with Johnson, Grant felt
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optimistic he could work with the president as Johnson seemed to pursue peace that reflected
Lincoln’s policies.195
The general was invited by Johnson to attend cabinet meetings and only spoke when his
opinion was requested. When Grant did speak, he stressed the need to establish civil authority in
the former Confederacy. Until courts were functional, Grant believed the best plan was to restore
the South into military districts until Congress set forth a plan.196 In November 1865, President
Johnson sent Grant to tour the South and report on the postwar conditions, if Southerners were
found to be hostile to the process, then military rule was to be continued. But if relations were to
be found harmonious, then Southerners could be trusted to carry the process on their own.
During his tour, Grant concluded that Southerners were "in a condition not to yield that ready
obedience to civil authority the American people have generally been in the habit of yielding."
Grant continued, "the presence of small garrisons throughout those states necessary until such
time as labor returns to its proper channel and civil authority is fully established."197
In his report, Grant shows two forms of thinking. One radical one, and one form with a
moderate, reconciliatory approach. The use of the Army as occupational forces during peacetime
was an unprecedented measure, and the argument can be made this was a radical use of the
Army, especially as the military acted as judicial authority where civil courts were nonexistent.
Yet, Grant developed a fear of black soldiers in the South and free blacks wanting seized
property stirring up a racial war represents a moderate approach to Reconstruction. This points to
his fear of a social revolution erupting in the South, with whites on one side and blacks on the
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other. But despite the argument that using the military as a tool for peace, Grant did so with a
moderate approach. He stressed to his generals that military aid is only to be used where the civil
courts failed to process cases. Being the general-in-chief, and with conditions in the South being
poor, Grant could have used the Army in a more revolutionary manner and treat the former
Confederacy as conquered territory as some Radicals wanted. 198 But, Grant believed he
understood the problem: white racism must be overcome in order for peace to last. On whites’
prejudices towards on the freed population, Grant wrote, “It cannot be expected that the opinions
held by men at the South for years can be changed in a day, and therefore the freedmen
require…not only laws to protect them but the fostering care of those who will give them good
counsel, and on whom they can rely.”199
In order to ensure a safe and peaceful transition into freedom, Grant argued federal
support and especially that of the Freedmen’s Bureau were necessary for free blacks.200 While
Grant accepted emancipation and the protection of the black population, it is clear through his
report he did not want to jeopardize reconciliation. Nor was Grant the only Union officer that
held these beliefs. Prior to his tour of the South, Generals Henry Halleck and Edward Ord
complained that the black soldiers were offensive to the white population and practiced improper
behavior. Naturally, the reports did not go unchallenged as Ord was accused of being a racist by
other officers. Still, Grant's beliefs were not rooted in a belief that black soldiers practiced bad
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behavior, nor did he believe the reports on their behavior. It was simple enough for Grant, the
mere presence of black soldiers invited racial tension.201
The debate over the use of black soldiers created a dilemma for Grant and other Union
officials in the early stages of Reconstruction. The dilemma proved that even if black soldiers
were on good behavior, their mere presence irritated Southern whites, already ashamed at the
results of the war. While Grant sought a moderate approach towards white Southerners, to
continue to allow black soldiers to remain in the South, was to invite violence and jeopardize
civil equality for free blacks. Any eruption of violence may or may not have been the fault of
black soldiers, but their presence did create tension among an already defeated and ashamed
population. Certainly, black soldiers held a sense of pride, rooted in escaping the plantation and
fighting for freedom. As Eric Foner argues, emancipation and participation in the war meant for
blacks, living in the North and the South, the possibility of the expansion of civil rights.
Additionally, many freedmen were convinced they held a right to the confiscated property of
their formers owners as the Freedmen's Bureau and the federal government initially held land in
South Carolina Georgia for the prospect of giving it to black and white refugees. Furthermore,
most freedmen held what seemed a natural belief that the land they once worked on belonged to
them.
This belief was fueled by Congressman Thaddeus Stevens as he argued, “It is important
to the delinquents whose property it takes as a fine-a punishment for the great crime of making
war to destroy the Republic, and for prosecuting the war in violation of all the rules of civilized
warfare.”202 The passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in January 1865 abolished slavery, but it
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did not settle the issues of civil or economic rights. This question was left to Grant and his
commanders in the South as he faced white racial prejudices, and a black population that sought
to demonstrate their autonomy, free from white control.
It was clear to Grant that both white and black Southerners needed the protection of the
military. Grant believed the Army offered the best form of protection, but he argued in his report
that white soldiers should be kept in the South, not black ones. Grant wanted all black regiments
raised in the North removed as occupational forces. Grant did not believe all Southerners would
necessarily attack Union soldiers, but he feared that some might. This was in the spirit of
protecting his men as he wrote "colored troops must be kept in bodies sufficient to defend
themselves."203 More importantly, Grant knew that freed slaves were still perceived by their
former masters as property that belonged to them by right. He further felt free blacks were
simply not ready to care for themselves without federal support. Because of these factors, Grant
concluded: "There is a danger of collisions being brought on by such causes."204
As discussed, the first priority of Grant and most Army officers was to ensure stability
and avoid any disturbances that might disrupt the peace made at Appomattox. Grant continued
his policy of keeping his political opinions to himself and focused solely on affairs related to the
military, and he maintained this in the early years of Reconstruction under Johnson. But as
Johnson became an obstacle to the Republican plan in the South, Grant shifted his position and
Congressional policy as he believed it was the most effective plan. Congress began to implement
its version of Reconstruction policy through the Civil Rights Bill. The legislation conferred
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federal citizenship to all persons born in the United States, established full equality under law to
all persons, and made it a federal crime to deprive any person of their civil rights. Johnson
vetoed the bill as he believed any form of legislation on the subject to be unconstitutional.
Johnson’s veto, however, was overridden by Congress. This began a deep rift between Johnson
and the Republican majority in Congress as the latter began to further develop their policy for the
South. This policy continued to take form through the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
passed over Johnson's objections. Then, the First and Second Reconstruction Acts were brought
up in Congress and represented the Republican plan for the South, with the latter passed over
Johnson's veto. The acts outlined the process of state elections in the occupied Southern states,
with the Second Act placing voter registration in the hands of military commanders.
Additionally, the states that had participated in the rebellion were divided into five military
districts, each was commanded by an army officer with a rank higher than that of brigadier
general. The powers vested in the military were both civil and military, and, as General of the
Army, Grant held authority over policies created within the districts. This included matters of
removing and appointing individuals to political offices. To further limit Johnson's objections,
and perhaps show a vote of confidence in Grant, Congress passed the Command of the Army Act
and the Office of Tenure Act. The Command of the Army Act provided that Grant could not be
removed from Washington against his will, and all matters pertaining to the military must be
approved by him.205
When Johnson assumed the presidency, he held the private support of Grant as the
general believed Johnson’s Reconstruction plans were a continuation of Lincoln’s. But by 1866,
Grant moved away from this position as it became evident Johnson did not want to frame peace
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as Lincoln would have done. In private letters to Julia, Grant voiced his displeasure at being
forced by Johnson to appear with the president in public, giving the impression that the Johnson
had the support of Grant. To Julia, Grant also characterized Johnson’s speeches as disgraces.
Because areas of the South failed to protect blacks and whites with Republican loyalties, Grant
began to instruct military commanders to take action where civil courts failed. He issued General
Order No. 3, which ordered commanders to protect soldiers and loyal persons from prosecution
done under orders against Confederate forces, and the order protected freedmen from being
prosecuted for offenses in which whites were not punished in the same manner. Additionally,
Grant issued General Order No. 44, which instructed Army commanders to arrest persons
charged with crimes when civil authorities failed, and to retain such persons until the courts were
functional. These moves by Grant were in stark contrast to Johnson’s position as the president
issued proclamations in April 1866 that restored civil authority in the South. Johnson viewed
Grant’s popularity as a political instrument, and if he could keep the general on his side, then he
could guarantee national support for his administration.
Grant did not seek public opposition to Johnson, but he did not play a passive role in
political affairs. In October, he resisted Johnson’s suggestions that soldiers be sent to Baltimore
to support the Democratic faction against the Republican faction. He opted instead to intervene
personally as a means to prevent violence.206 This action shows not only shows his resistance to
the president, but also his resistance to the Democratic party in favor of the Republicans, and by
1867 Grant moved into an even more active political role as he further distanced himself from
Johnson. Grant agreed with the president that a swift peace was needed in the South, but he
aligned himself with the Radical Republicans on the issue of civil rights. He pressed General
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Edward Ord to push for the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in Arkansas, as he argued
the amendment was “hardly a party matter.”207
With the Republicans celebrating the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866,
Johnson continued to enlist Grant to stand by his side during political speeches as a means to
show the public he held the support of hero of Appomattox. Using the ever popular general was
the perfect political device for Johnson as it was the best way to keep the public on his side.
During the spring of 1867, Grant pledged support for the Congressional plan of Reconstruction
and was ready to use the Army to aid in rebuilding Southern state governments. As he prepared
to do this, he remained suspicious of Johnson. Through the power of the Reconstruction Acts,
Grant believed it was crucial to remove obstructionist civil officials as they threatened new
legislation. Army commanders faced the difficult decision as to who should be removed and on
what terms. General Sheridan in his Fifth District warned individuals that those who impeded the
process of reorganizing state government were to be removed. General John Pope in his district
also used the threat of removal to state officials if they were not in compliance with the
Reconstruction Acts. Grant, for his part, applauded such acts, and he interpreted his role to be an
advisory one to his district commanders. He suggested that instead of removing officials, they
should be suspended and tried by military courts. But as Pope reported to Grant, simply
removing such officials and overseeing the drafting of new state constitutions was not enough to
speed the process of reconstruction. Pope reported to Grant on the loopholes state officials
exploited to continue the disfranchisement of blacks. Congress passed a Third Reconstruction
Act, and this gave district commanders the power to suspend or remove officials and appoint
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their own. The powerful piece of legislation expanded Grant’s powers as he could approve or
disapprove such decisions and could replace or suspend civil officials on his own.208
While Grant simply had oversight authority and not total authority over Reconstruction,
the ability for the Army to remove civil officials was still a powerful one, and it forced Grant to
make political decisions on his own. By removing officials, albeit ones that sought to
disfranchise black voters, Grant displayed political agency as he replaced such officials with
those that were sympathetic to the Republican agenda. It was no longer a matter of focusing
solely on the military’s role as Grant was aiding in changing the political landscape in the South.
Relations between Johnson and the Republicans in Congress continued to deteriorate, and
Grant found himself in the middle. Johnson vetoed the Third Reconstruction Act, and Congress
overrode his veto. In addition, Johnson disliked Sheridan’s removal policy in Louisiana and
thought of transferring him from his district. Unable to do this, Johnson moved to replace
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton with Grant. Stanton had been at odds with Johnson, and
replacing him with Grant could aid Johnson in two ways. First, by having Grant in the cabinet,
the administration would have the public’s support, but most importantly, having Grant as part of
the cabinet might eliminate him as a potential Republican presidential candidate in 1868 as it
would give the impression he supported the administration. Stanton however, was protected by
the Office of Tenure Act, and could not be removed without the consent of Congress, and Grant
reminded Johnson of this. Taking the position at the expense of Stanton does seem like an odd
move for Grant, but he appeared to have the larger issue of Reconstruction in mind when he did
so. The general reminded Johnson that he objected to Stanton's removal as he feared "that some
one would be appointed in his stead who would, by opposition to the laws relating to the
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restoration of the Southern States...embarrass the Army in the performance of duties especially
imposed upon it by these laws..."209 Despite his objection to Stanton's removal, Grant took the
position as a means to protect the Army and to better monitor it. This was a swift political move
on the part of Grant, as by participating in cabinet meetings, he could ensure the Army was safe
from Johnson. Still, Johnson called on Stanton to resign, and of course, the secretary refused to
do so. Johnson approached Grant once more about the position, and Grant accepted. This,
however, proved to not be the case. Johnson moved to remove Sheridan in August, and Grant
contended that doing so was not the wisest decision, but the order stood, and Sheridan was
removed and replaced with General George H. Thomas. Certainly, Johnson’s move was purely
political as he understood he was not wanted by the Republicans, and the Democrats cried the
loudest for Sheridan’s removal.210
The inability to stop Johnson from removing Sheridan and General Daniel Sickles as
district commanders in the South finally pushed Grant to distance himself from the
administration. Republicans and newspapers supporting the party were not sure where the
general stood politically, and Grant did little to reassure them of his position. The New Albany
Daily Commercial reprinted an article from the New York Tribune on Grant’s failure to prevent
the removals, “[Grant] has been too easy with [Johnson], too good natured, too anxious to please,
and so has been betrayed into false positions…,” the article continued, “It is time for him now to
be stern. He should know that the President means war, and that he cannot escape a sublime
responsibility.”211 But Grant continued to refrain himself from making political speeches, and
was only willing to express his opinions on matters pertaining to Reconstruction. Grant then
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decided to make his dispute with the president public by releasing to the press his letter
protesting Sheridan’s removal. Grant’s words were well-received as he was viewed as a defender
of Congressional policy, even though the Radicals in Congress were not convinced.
As the Radicals pushed for Johnson’s impeachment over the Office of Tenure Act, Grant
did not advocate for the impeachment of Johnson. He accepted the position on the premise that if
the Senate were to reinstate Stanton, he would either hold on to the office, as a test against the
Office of Tenure Act, or vacate it so Johnson could fill the office. As Grant reminded Johnson,
“[Grant] could not without violation of the law, refuse to vacate the office of Sec. of War the
moment Mr. Stanton was reinstated by the Senate…”212 There is little doubt Grant was being
sincere, but his actions were laced with political implications, as holding on to the office and
defying Senate Republicans meant Grant could continue to manage affairs in the South. But as
Republicans faced a growing opposition to their policies by both Southerners and Johnson,
House Republicans moved to pass a bill that would give Grant greater power by allowing him to
appoint and remove commanders, effectively rendering Johnson’s power to do so obsolete. The
bill was not passed as Grant objected to any legislation that might result in a direct struggle with
between himself and Johnson.213
But the desire to avoid a confrontation with Johnson disappeared as Congress convened
on January 14, 1868 and the president was required to defend his removal of Stanton under the
Office of Tenure Act. Johnson defended his action by arguing Stanton was not in harmony with
the administration, was partly responsible for the New Orleans riot in 1866, and had declared the
Tenure Act unconstitutional. With the debate growing on who was to fill the position, Johnson
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argued he held the authority to fill the position and was ready to take on any fine or
imprisonment. Grant for his part, reversed his position and stated to Johnson he was not going to
hold on to the office if it meant a fine or imprisonment. Johnson conveniently ignored this
previous correspondence. The Republicans meanwhile wanted to avoid a situation where the
position would remain vacant with Johnson free to fill it. Then, on January 13, the Senate voted
to refuse to concur with the removal of Stanton. The following morning, Grant closed the door to
the Secretary of War’s office and returned the key to Assistant Adjutant General Edward
Townsend, who in turn gave them to Stanton. Relations between Grant and Johnson finally
broke down as Johnson encouraged the publication of reports which charged Grant with acting
out of bad faith. This act on the part of Johnson led the two men to offer an exchange of letters
offering differing accounts on the events. Grant took high offense to Johnson's charge that the
general deceived Johnson and took the office of Secretary of War in order to oppose
administration policy. There is no question Grant had little respect for Johnson and his policies
when he was appointed, but Johnson either ignored this, or simply failed to recognize Grant’s
attitudes. Johnson may have appointed Grant based on the assumption that having the general
appear with the administration would bring and keep the public on his side. Nonetheless, the
heated exchange between Grant and the President led to a bitter hostility that lasted the rest of
their lives. For Grant, Johnson's actions led to the general to write Johnson a scathing letter in
which he argued his "honor as a soldier and integrity as a man have been to violently assailed,"
as he believed Johnson's actions were an "attempt to involve [Grant] in the resistance of law," in
which Johnson "hesitated to assume the responsibility of orders." Finally, Grant wrote Johnson
that the president's actions tried to "destroy [Grant's] character before the country."214 Finally, the
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House drafted nine articles of impeachment, and in May 1868, Johnson escaped impeachment as
the necessary two-thirds majority was not reached.215
In the midst of the political struggle with Johnson, Grant and the Republicans in
Congress faced continual violence in the South and efforts by Southerners to economically and
politically alienate free blacks. It is difficult to imagine Grant believed reconciliation was still
possible as acts of violence against free blacks spread throughout the South. For example, in the
city of Memphis, Tennessee, racial tension erupted as a mob of white citizens and policemen,
encouraged by municipal officials, attacked blacks living in the city. Economic tensions were at
the root of the riot as black civilians were forced to compete with the Irish population of the city
for low skilled jobs. Racial tensions were especially high between the black population and the
Irish population. Within the Memphis police force, 163 officers were with Irish or of Irish
descent. The officers were quick to arrest any black person for even the slightest offense, and
they held a deep disdain for black men who served in the Union Army. The arrests and beating
of black soldiers by Irish officers ignited the riots. On April 30, 1866, the enlistment services of
the soldiers in the city ended, and although the Army reclaimed their weapons, many of the black
soldiers were able to keep their pistols. Irish police officers held a record of beating and arresting
black soldiers, but on May 1, the former soldiers decided to defend a black individual being
arrested for disorderly conduct. Violence erupted into a riot as a mob quickly formed and
wantonly targeted the city’s black population, including Army veterans. Moreover, a fire
consumed the city as property belonging to black citizens was destroyed, including ninety-one
houses, four churches, and twelve schools. Over forty-six black citizens were killed, eighty
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people were wounded, five black women were raped, and two whites were killed. Finally, gangs
robbed one-hundred other persons, and ten individuals were severely beaten.216
The riot was preceded by one in Norfolk, Virginia on April 16, 1866. Conflict erupted
when a demonstration supporting the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment grew out of control.
Black demonstrators were escorted by armed black veterans of the Union Army. Violence
erupted after a white intoxicated off-duty police officer arrested the wrong offender, as he
mistook the individual for a child that fired a black rifle volley. The officer and his son were
beaten by the black demonstrators in the vicinity, and organized armed bands of whites
retaliated. Two blacks were killed, with several injured. Three days after the riot, seven black
individuals were arraigned and charged with disturbance. No white persons were arrested,
despite the deaths and the attack on the army officer in charge of the Norfolk area.217
The riots surely revealed a problem to Grant. Even with the presence of white soldiers,
Southern white citizens were still pursing violence, and reconciliation appeared to be out of
reach. Grant had had enough. As violence continued, Grant believed a military force was still
needed as the areas with the most violence were areas that did not see war. To Grant the areas
that suffered from violence “needed to feel the blighting effects of the war” in order to gain a
sense of “of the enormity of their crime and the necessity of thorough repentance.”218 Violence
continued as poor economic conditions in New Orleans in 1867 prompted General William Scott
Hancock to report to Grant that "Destitution and threatened famine, principally on the part of the
freedmen, together with imperfect ideas of their rights, prompt them to the commission of theft
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of food, generally so far by killing cattle, and hogs-retaliation follows."219 Unpaid black laborers
and failed crops led Hancock to ask Grant for aid for the destitute freedmen, Grant responded by
sending three to four companies of men.
Now believing that parts of the South needed to feel the hard hand of war, General Grant
played an active political role in the early years of Reconstruction, also known as Presidential
Reconstruction under Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson. In order to ensure the
protection of southern Unionists and freedmen, the U.S. military took jurisdiction over cases
involving these groups. For instance, as he further grew dissatisfied with Johnson’s indifference
to violence in the South, Grant issued General Order No. 3 in which he ordered commanders to
protect soldiers, government agents, and to prevent freedmen from being prosecuted for offenses
whites were not punished for. Hostilities in the South remained high and Grant responded by
issuing General Orders No. 44, which ordered Union commanders to arrest persons charged with
violence where civil authorities failed. Officers were also ordered to hold arrested persons in
confinement until a proper court was ready to try them. Influenced by reports that violence was
rampant from Texas to Tennessee, Grant moved in the opposite direction of Johnson, as the
president issued peace proclamation that restored civil authority in the South on April 2 and
August 20, 1866. Yet, it appeared there was no end in sight to the violence as civil authorities in
the South refused to offer protection to the black population. Southern rejection of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which addressed citizen rights and ensured equal protection under the law, finally
forced Grant’s hand. Efforts towards compromise had failed as Southerners refused to end racial
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prejudice. Grant took an active role in drafting reconstruction legalization that reinforced the
need for military occupation.220
In addition to using the military to uphold civil liberties, Grant began to focus on national
politics, despite his distrust of politicians and desire to keep the military separate from politics.
By 1867, Grant urged the commander in Arkansas, General Edward Ord, to use his influence to
gain favor for the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Grant played an active part in drafting the
First Reconstruction Act. The Act divided the ten Southern states still not represented in
Congress into five military districts, each headed by a major general appointed by the president,
per Grant’s request. Furthermore, existing civil governments were labeled provisional and
subordinate to the military, and the states must ratify the Fourteenth Amendment in order to be
accepted by Congress. Problems with this legislation surfaced when Union Generals Philip
Sheridan and John Pope removed government officials in the states of Louisiana and Georgia,
claims began to surface in the South that the military was exceeding its powers. Ever protective
of his generals, Grant suggested that in the future suspended officials be tried in military courts
as he believed the military held unquestionable power to do so. To Grant, the South was simply
conquered territory and every action, including that of the executive, must be taken to enforce
congressional policy.221
In an interview with John Russell Young, Grant reflected back on Reconstruction and
believed that the best policy for the South was to further incorporate military rule. Grant further
argued that depriving a portion of Southerners from participating in politics was the right of the
North as a "conqueror." He further defended the use of the military in intervening in political
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affairs as the "penalty for the stupendous crime of treason."222 To Grant military rule represented
the most just form of government to all Southerners, especially to the black population, as it
protected loyal whites, and offered blacks the best chance to achieve full equality and freedom.
To argue that military rule is the best form of government is not only a radical concept for an
American politician, but Grant was not a full-fledged politician. He had been a military man his
entire life. Yet, he balanced this radical thinking with a form of moderation as he admitted to
Young "The trouble with military rule in the South was that our people did not like it. It was not
in accordance with our institutions."223 Here Grant understood that military rule was not possible
under the Constitution and would not have pressed for it as doing so surely would have led to a
massive political, if not armed, struggle. For Grant, the problem with military rule and
Reconstruction was that the North wanted to ensure the South was politically powerless forever.
Instead, he believed the best method would have been to postpone black suffrage, state
governments in the South, and reconstruction as a whole for ten years, and keep the South in a
territorial status, although he did not specify for how long.224 Keeping an entire portion of the
United States and American citizens in territorial status is equally a radical concept, but it is
likely Grant did not pursue this as he may understood this was not the best policy, or perhaps
impossible to impose, for the country during Reconstruction.
With his success during the war, Grant was viewed as a potential rival for Lincoln during
the 1864 presidential election. Grant refused to participate in politics at the time, as he distrusted
politicians, and pledged allegiance to Lincoln. In the aftermath of Johnson’s acquittal however,
the Radicals position in the Republican Party weakened and Grant’s nomination seemed
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inevitable. Despite the weakened influence of the Radicals, Johnson still bowed out of the
political fight, and Congress moved to the writing of Republican-favored constitutions for the
Southern states. During the war Grant fully cooperated with Lincoln and Congress in supporting
emancipation, and he emerged from the war as the hero of Appomattox. But despite his backing
of Congressional policy during Johnson’s presidency, Radical leaders remained wary of Grant’s
positions. Wendell Philips labeled Grant the “Great American Riddle” in an 1867 speech on the
general’s potential nomination. While Philips did not question Grant’s successes as a general, he
warned his audience, “All I ask of admirers is, what is [Grant’s] idea of this moment, and what
his policy is for the future? What is his view of the present duty and the future necessity?”
Furiously, Philips added, “He says to the American people—nothing; and his friends praise him
that he says nothing!”225 Still, a Democratic victory in the 1868 election might undo the
Republicans’ efforts in the South. But Grant was viewed as the likely Republican candidate as
his candidacy promised moderation largely due to his lack of ideological convictions, and an
effort to stabilize efforts in the South. Like Grant himself, his nomination was simple, as was his
campaigning. He did not campaign and no one campaigned on his behalf. The delegates at the
Republican convention simply held confidence that the hero of Appomattox was a lock for the
nomination. Likewise, no other candidate challenged Grant, to do so was simply futile. A group
of Union soldiers gathered in Chicago, the site of the convention, and marched to the convention
in support of their general. Grant had not sought the nomination, and was in Washington when
he received word of his nomination.226
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During the summer of 1868, the leader of the Radicals, Thaddeus Stevens, succumbed to
illness and died. Stevens' passing, the failure to remove Johnson, and Grant's nomination shifted
the power in the Republican Party from Steven's cry of full equality to Grant's call for peace.227
In accepting the nomination for the Republican Party, Grant pledged to, “administer all the laws,
in good faith, with economy, and with the view of giving peace, quiet, and protection
everywhere.” Simply put, Grant concluded: “Let us have peace.”228 But, peace was not to come
easy. Violence in the South, coupled with the fight to reject black suffrage, proved that the gains
made by the Union victory in the war were hanging on loose threads as military rule and the
restructuring of Southern state governments based on Republican ideals did little to change the
South. Grant was offering the South peace, but not at the expense of gains made thus far during
Reconstruction.
Upon being elected, Grant gave a speech in Galena, Illinois and was ready for the
difficult task that appeared before him, proclaiming, “The responsibilities of the position I feel,
but accept them without fear…”229 In his Inaugural Address, Grant promised to uphold all the
laws in the Constitution and ensured his policies were not to be enforced against the will of the
people.230 Grant urged Americans that the problems facing the Union “should be approached
calmly, without prejudice, hate, or sectional pride”231 In order to accomplish this Grant argued
reconciliation required the “security of person, property, and for religious and political opinions,
without regard to local prejudice.”232 In a tone parallel to Lincoln, Grant called an end to all
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prejudices against persons of color to end, truly calling for equality for all. Grant recognized his
administration faced a situation never faced by previous presidents, and he called for an end to
the sectional differences that plagued the nation since the turn of the 19th century. Grant’s tone
however, should not be mistaken as one of appeasement to the South. Underneath his
conciliatory tone was the belief of using the military to ensure all laws, including those
guaranteeing civil and political rights, were observed. President Grant argued to Congress “The
authority of the United States, which has been vindicated by military power, must undoubtedly
be asserted for the absolute protection of all its citizens.”233 This is certainly an expansion of
executive power, already begun by Lincoln, as Grant interpreted his role as commander-in-chief
was to use all powers necessary to protect all citizens. This is beyond what Lincoln had done,
however, as Lincoln resorted to using the military during wartime. Grant proposed to do so
during peace and not against persons claiming to be belligerents at war, but against U.S. citizens
should they rebel against the federal government again.
With a Republican back in the executive office, Congressional Republicans believed they
could focus on civil equality. With military rule in only three states, Texas, Mississippi, and
Virginia, Grant’s challenge as president was to protect the new racial order he fought for as
general. However, stubborn resistance still remained as a Southern counterrevolution sought to
block the political advancement of free blacks. In his first annual address to Congress, Grant
made his stance on equality clear. Grant stood firm in his duty to protect all citizens, and their
property, no matter their race. In return, Grant asked Americans for “obedience to the laws and
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proper respect for the rights of others.”234 With this, the President appealed to the public that the
rights of others must be respected.235
Yet, violence in South continued to demonstrate that many Southerners, including
elements of the Democratic Party, were still unwilling to allow any advancement of civil
equality, and Grant sought to demonstrate that equality was to be his top priority. With Grant’s
advocacy, the Fifteenth Amendment was added to the U.S. Constitution in 1870, guaranteeing
the right to vote to all Americans and forbidding actions that limited the right to vote. The
amendment was passed primarily along party lines as not a single House Democrat supported the
bill. Despite the Fourteenth and now the Fifteenth Amendments’ protection, many Democrats
still sought to undermine the rights of black citizens. Democrats wanted to “redeem” the South, a
euphemism for white supremacy, and they responded to the Fifteenth Amendment by developing
methods of disenfranchising black voters. Democrats in the state of Delaware, a border state that
used slave labor, proclaimed the state was not “morally bound” by any postwar amendments to
the Constitution. By 1873, the state implemented poll taxes at voting locations, effectively
disenfranchising a large portion of black voters. Tennessee also implemented a poll tax while
Virginia gerrymandered districts, barred from voting those who could not pay a poll tax or had
been convicted of a minor larceny, and reduced the number of polling places in black districts.
Democrats in the state of Georgia enforced poll taxes, created new residency requirements, and
registration requirements. These moves sharply affected black voters and eliminated Republican
candidates in many elections within the state. Disenfranchisement, coupled with ongoing
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violence, made it clear to Grant and the Republicans in Congress that Southerners were willing
to adopt any measure to uphold political and social equality for whites only.236
The turmoil in the South came to a climax when the Ku Klux Klan began intimidating the
black population in the South. The Ku Klux Klan was founded in 1866, but after the passage of
the Fifteenth Amendment and Grant’s constant support for equality for black citizens, the Klan
grew more violent as blacks were now gaining greater equality relative to whites. Unlike the
highly organized and politically powerful Klan of the early 20th century, the Klan in 1870 was
not a structured organization as different county chapters acted on their own initiatives. Historian
Allen W. Trelease argues that the Klan’s founding occurred in 1866 in Tennessee, and was
founded for pure amusement, a sort of social gathering for the individuals bored with the end of
the Civil War. He further argues that the Klan’s later activities involving political terrorism, were
not adopted until vigilantes took over the organization in 1867 and 1868. Bullying blacks had
long been an established pastime in the South, and early Klan members participated in this
practice. However, as free blacks began to appear to be less servile in the eyes of white
Tennesseans, bands of whites, including the Klan, saw it as their duty dismantle the social,
political, and economic agency of blacks. Still, the organization was unified in purpose: serving
as a military force for the Democratic Party, the wealthy planter class, and any individual
seeking the restoration of the antebellum status quo. The Klan, including groups like the Knights
of the White of Camelia and the White Brotherhood, aimed to reverse the social changes in the
South, destroy the Republican political infrastructure, and ensure black citizens were once more
submissive to the white population. The Klan tried to do this by creating an atmosphere of terror
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in which black voters would be dissuaded from voting for the Republican Party. U.S. Attorney,
John A. Minnis wrote to Grant describing the function of the Klan and the other groups in the
state of Alabama: "I was well assured there were 'Ku Klux' organizations in the State under some
name or another, and that these organizations were mainly, if not entirely, brought into
existence...with a political ANIMUS, mainly to control, directly, or indirectly, the politics of the
Country.”237
The Klan quickly expanded after Congress passed the Reconstruction Acts in 1867 and
groups represented every state of the former Confederacy, plus the state of Kentucky. In parts of
the South, black public officials faced violence on a daily basis. In June 1871, two petitions from
the citizens of Dublin, Alabama, reached Grant describing Klan activities in Fayette County. One
petition describes the violence as: "Armed bands styling themselves Ku Klux are Committing
Crimes and outrages upon peaceable and law abiding citizens. Murders by these ruffians who
have long disgraced this County are of common occurrence. The civil authorities have been
overawed and are utterly powerless to execute the laws."238 While it is unfair to assume all
Democrats pledged support to the Klan, witnesses to acts of violence insisted the main targets
were blacks and whites supporting the Republican Party, with Democrats being spared. Those
who were threatened with violence were individuals who decided to stand up to the Klan.239 Out
of fear of federal intervention Democrats in the state of South Carolina held public meetings to
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denounce Klan violence, but ended up denouncing the federal government, as these state
officials reached the conclusion that citizens must fend for themselves.240 Additionally, Violence
in New Orleans prevented citizens from exercising their political rights. Lieutenant Governor
Oscar J. Dunn wrote Grant: “We cannot, in the absence of your interposition, exercise our
political privileges, except at personal peril, or else by using violence in self protection." Grant
responded by authorizing the Federal Marshall of Louisiana, S.B. Packard, with the necessary
authority to "secure the protection of free speech."241
The Klan used various techniques to achieve its aims. In Laurens County, South
Carolina, for example, bands of the Klan rode through the countryside threatening blacks by
firing their weapons. Klan night riders resorted to the same tactic in Abbeville County as they
not only rode through plantations urging blacks not vote, but by beating potential voters on the
eve of Election Day.242 By intimidating, and even murdering, black voters, the Klan sought to
erase any concept of liberty for blacks, including voting and holding political office. Violence in
South Carolina ran rampant as Senator John Scott reported to Grant the findings of a federal subcommittee sent to investigate the state of affairs in South Carolina. He described the violence in
the South Carolina counties of Spartanburg and York as running “riot with impunity,” with all
warnings to disperse being “disregarded and the efforts of the well disposed citizens have proved
unavailing.”243 In addition, citizens in these counties were unable to testify to the federal
committee officials as Klan members threatened them from doing so. One man who was able to

240

Javan Bryant to Ulysses S. Grant, September 8, 1871, in The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, ed. by John Y.
Simon, XXII, 167n.
241
Oscar J. Dunn to Ulysses S. Grant, July 29, 1871, in The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, ed. by John Y.
Simon, XXII, 101n.; Ulysses S. Grant, Endorsement, August 3, 1871, ibid.
242
Shapiro, “The Ku Klux Klan During Reconstruction: The South Carolina Episode,” 36-37.
243
John Scott to Ulysses S. Grant, September 1, 1871 in The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, in The Papers of
Ulysses S. Grant, ed. by John Y. Simon, XXII, 164n.

122
testify went home to find armed men in his house threatening him and his family.244 Warren
Diver of Barnwell County, South Carolina wrote Grant that he must leave the county or change
his political views as he was told “no damned Radical will be tolerated.”245
Black churches and schools were not spared as they became targets of daily violence in
the state of Kentucky. Any black individual that wanted to obtain an education was murdered,
and a library was burned down by the Georgia Klan for simply loaning books out to black
individuals. But the most “offensive” blacks were those that were able to achieve economic
success. Klan night riders in South Carolina murdered a black man working on a plantation
because it was being rented out, not by a white man, but by a black man. Most Klan activity was
active in regions where the black population was a small majority, such as South Carolina. Many
Democrats, rather than publicly shame the Klan, lessened the acts of violence or denied the
Klan’s existence altogether. A captured member of the Klan, William Tolbert, from Abbott
County, South Carolina confessed that county Democrats were members of the Klan and
intended to terrorize the black population. The Democrats of Pickens County voted on a
resolution that threatened to evict from their homes any person caught voting for the Republican
Party. In order to protect their families and property, an armed band of black South Carolinians
roamed the countryside in an effort to rid the county of the Klan. A group of armed blacks in
1871 lynched three white men accused of murdering a black lawyer. While some individuals
opted for retaliation against the Klan, many throughout the South believed the government and
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its laws protected them, no matter how flawed the system had become. However for most blacks,
resistance was simply bound to enrage the white population and invite even more violence.246
With Republican policy in danger of being completely eliminated, Congress and the
President decisively responded to the Klan. The previously passed Fifteenth Amendment, done
so with Grant’s support in 1870, not only made it a federal crime to prevent an individual from
voting, but also allowed Congress to draft enforcement legislation. The first enforcement act
criminalized the use of force to keep voters from voting, while the second enforcement
authorized federal officials for the first time in American history to supervise voting.247 These
measures were indeed historic as the scope of federal power expanded to criminalize individual
behavior, bypassing state law. But for Grant, this was not enough. He wanted more. The
president argued legislation was needed to fully protect life and property in areas of the South
where civil authority was nonexistent. In order to do this, Grant argued to Congress that the
power of the Executive is capable of protecting persons in the South.248 Of course, the
Democrats in Congress were less than pleased with Grant’s demands. Representative Fernando
Wood of New York, argued the bill was anti-American as he proclaimed: “In no portion of our
history has any such power been delegated by the people. Nor is there any despot for the past
century who would attempt to exercise it.”249 This demand was in line with Grant’s belief that
the military represented the perfect instrument for order in the South as has been previously
discussed. He was correct in his assertion that the country would not support military rule, but in
1871, he persevered and held Congress in line as the third of the enforcement acts was passed.
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Under Grant’s recommendation the Enforcement Acts were adopted in 1870 and 1871
and forbade state officials from discriminating voters on the basis of race and authorized Grant to
appoint election supervisors who brought cases of voter intimidation to federal court. Grant
continued to gain Radical Republican support as his actions were proof that he was devoted to
black equality. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the third of Enforcement Acts, designated
specific crimes committed by individuals as offenses being punishable under federal law. If
states failed to prosecute individuals who sought to deprive citizens the right to vote, hold office,
or serve on juries, federal district attorneys could now prosecute them. Finally, the act threatened
states with military intervention and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The act can be
considered a radical measure as it combined the use of military enforcement with the suspension
of habeas corpus, essentially allowing the military to make arrests based on suspicions of Klan
activity. Only in South Carolina did the Enforcement Acts come into play, but the Republicans
defended the acts as part of the expansion of federal power brought on by the Civil War.250
In Federalist No. 84, Alexander Hamilton argued the establishment of habeas corpus was
a security to republicanism. Hamilton further argued that “the practice of arbitrary
imprisonments, have been, in all ages the favorite and most formidable instruments of
tyranny.”251 Hamilton defended the suspension of habeas corpus was necessary if the country
faced rebellion or public endangerment. By 1871, the violence in the South certainly created an
environment that not only endangered citizens, but was also a rebellion against federal law. Now
Grant held the power to use the militarily intervene on the behalf of U.S. citizens, albeit against
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U.S. citizens during peacetime. Democrats argued that if the Federal government could punish
crime within the states, then local government would be destroyed. But the Republican majority
argued in favor of the Ku Klux Klan Act by asserting national power had been expanded to this
extent by Lincoln during the war. Republicans now believed the federal government can now
fully protect its citizens.252
Under this new power in October 1871, Grant ordered Klansmen in nine South Carolina
counties to disperse within five days or federal intervention was to be used. In addition Grant
ordered these Klansmen to surrender all arms and disguises to officers of the United States
military. Largely ignored, the ultimatum expired on October 17, 1871 and Grant suspended the
writ of habeas corpus in those nine counties.253 U.S. Attorney General, Amos T. Akerman
reasoned the president’s actions were necessary by arguing on the Klan’s actions:
The members are bound to obedience and secresy by oaths which they are taught
to regard as of higher obligation than the lawful oaths taken before civil magistrates.
They are organized and armed. They effect their objects by personal violence often
extending to murder. They terrify witnesses. They control juries in the State Courts
and sometimes the Courts of the United States…Unless these combinations shall
be thoroughly suppressed, no citizen who opposes their political objects will be
permitted to live, and no freedman will enjoy essential liberty, in the territory now
subject to their sway.254
Federal soldiers occupied the region and made over 168 arrests. Democrats denounced
the act as unconstitutional and a violation of civil liberty. In a contradictory manner, many
Democrats condemned the act because they were forced to end their hostilities to black citizens.
However, Grant felt legal actions require coercion, despite the suppression of civil liberties.
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Scores of arrests were made and many of those arrested were tried by all black juries and
convicted by federal attorneys. Grant was able to execute a great display of peacetime authority
greater than his predecessors and has not been equaled since. Grant’s intervention in the South,
was necessary as he did so to uphold the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The laws of the
federal government were being disregarded by Southerners and Grant was within is legal means
to enforce and protect the laws of the United States. His intervention was very effective as the
Klan was virtually eliminated until its revival in the twentieth century. Even though only a small
percentage of Klansmen were convicted of their heinous crime, the swift attack on the group
yielded a larger, positive response. It became clear that eh federal government was willing to
exercise authority to protect voters, white and black, but it the process of enforcement also
restored ordered and reinvigorated morale in Southern Republicans.255
In addition to the violence brought on by the Ku Klux Klan and other terror groups, Grant
was faced with contested elections in the South from 1872 to 1875. The most radical incident
involved a gubernatorial election in the state of Louisiana in which the Republican candidate,
William Kellogg and the Democratic candidate, John McEnry, claimed victory. After Kellogg
claimed to be the winner by a federal judge, the state militia mutinied against him. Grant
responded by ordering federal troops to suppress the uprising, assuring Kellogg he would not be
overthrown during his term. Because voters refused to recognize Kellogg, internal problems
continued. Kellogg wrote to Grant that the Democrats shifted tactics from fraud to one of
violence and murder. During the spring of 1873, a siege of Colfax, the seat of Grant Parish,
occurred in which black Republicans fought off a forcible take over by white Democrats. The
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Democrats were able to overtake the Republicans as they were armed with rifles and a Civil War
cannon. Several were killed, even after they surrendered. The following year, a “White League”
was formed as a dedication to the redemption of the state on behalf of the Democrats and hoped
to install McEnery as governor. The League was additionally dedicated to restoring white
supremacy as it targeted Republican office holders, attacked black laborers, and disrupted court
sessions.256 Kellogg believed Grant’s desire to stay out of previous affairs in Arkansas created
the impression in his state that the President was all words and no action. But the violence
intensified as the 1874 election approached. Kellogg reported to Grant an event in which several
elected officials were murdered by the White League, including black witness. The violence
moved to New Orleans as police confronted the League in a small battle. The unrest in
Louisiana now mirrored that of South Carolina and Grant had no choice but to intervene. Citing
his responsibility to enforce the law and protect persons from violence, Grant gave the insurgents
five days to disperse or face Federal soldiers. In a show of power, the President ordered infantry
units and three warships to converge on the state. The display of power worked, and the
insurgents finally dispersed.257
This is not to suggest Grant’s intervention policy was along partisan lines as he refused to
intervene in Texas when Republican Governor Edmund J. Davis was defeated by the Democratic
candidate. Grant not only refused to be persuaded by party politics, but he displayed moderation
in his policy, as he allowed for events to unfold and determined whether they violated the
Constitution. Upon losing the gubernatorial election to Democrat Richard Coke in 1873, Davis
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was under the strong impression that the election was rigged in favor of Coke. Violence had not
occurred, but Davis argued to the President it was not out of the question.258 But after having
used the Army in South Carolina, Grant understood such a measure could only be used rarely or
he risked losing Republican and public support. Grant wrote to Davis that the call for troops was
“not made in accordance to the Constitution of the United States, and Acts of Congress under it,
and Cannot therefore be granted.”259
The Constitution allowed Grant to deal with insurrections on the scope of the Klan’s
activities. Mundane acts of violence, however, were left up to the state authorities, and Texas
was not under threat of violence. Although citizens of Texas wrote Grant to “break up the
assemblage of Maniac-Ruffians-and Thieves,” as they “would not hesitate to make a constitution
that would place the colored man in a peonage worse than Slavery,” Grant told Davis he would
not send federal soldiers as the federal government cannot intervene in elections where the losing
party lost because they were not in the favor of the voters.260 Grant understood mounting
complaints on the infringement of rights, but he was adamant in protecting the liberties of black
citizens. It was his duty as president to do so for failure meant federal authority “[was] without
meaning, force, or effect, and the whole scheme of colored enfranchisement is [a] worse
mockery and little better than crime.”261 He still maintained some form of conciliation to
Southerners despite the years of constant upheaval. He urged Southerners not directly involved
in violence to stop ignoring the ongoing conditions and condemn the violence so that the nation
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can prosper. Further disenfranchisement of black citizens, however, will continue to result in
federal intervention.
In his draft for his 1874 annual message, Grant defended federal intervention in the
South. For Grant, he was within his rights as the executive to use the Army to intervene as it was
not against the law to do so, despite public opinion against it.262 Like Lincoln, Grant placed the
fate of federal intervention not in the hands of the government, but in the hands of the people.
For even law abiding citizens in the South turned a blind eye at the violence as nothing had been
done to stop it. Grant wrote that “Violence had been rampant in some localities and has either
been justified or denied by those who could have prevented it.” Furthermore, Grant made it clear
to Southerners: “Treat the Negro as a citizen and a voter--as he is, and must remain--as soon
parties will be divided, not on the colored line, but on principle. Then we will have a Union not
calling for interference in one section that would not be exercised under circumstances unlike
any other.”263 This text in the President’s draft made it to his final speech to Congress, and it
displays Grant’s continual call for peace. He provides the South terms to prevent violence, and
refusal to accept black citizens as citizens will continue to draw his attention. The policy of
peace was Grant’s since the start of the Civil War, but since his time as a general and by his
second term in office, it was clear that peace was not to come easily. He was correct in assuming
white racism must be overcome to secure peace, but it appeared by 1874 he no longer willing to
wait for this to happen. Instead, he placed he issue if federal intervention on Southerners, and
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when they accept blacks as citizens, the country “shall have no complaint of sectional
interference.”264
With Grant arguing on the need for more federal intervention, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, and it topped a decade’s worth of efforts by Radical Republicans, led by
Senator Charles Sumner, to fully enfranchise black Americans by outlawing discrimination in
public transportation, theaters, inns, and other places of public enjoyment, however, the clause
outlawing segregation of public schools was gutted by the House. The law was passed in
response to the ever multiplying Jim Crow laws in the South that segregated black citizens in
every form of public life. Grant favored the bill and he urged Congress to pass a bill that fully
secured the rights of all black citizens. But the Civil Rights Act was overshadowed by Grant’s
further intervention in Louisiana in 1875. Many Northerners and moderate and liberal
Republicans began to condemn Grant’s actions as they felt the party’s image was being
damaged. For the first time since 1856, the Democrats captured the House of Representatives,
and won ten seats in the Senate. In Louisiana, state elections resulted in the statehouse being
eventually divided along party lines, although the election was marred with fraud, intimidation,
and irregularities. But with five seats still undecided, Grant did not want to risk further violence,
something he argued against in Texas, and sent General Philip Sheridan to the state. Sheridan
was given a military blank check by his old friend as Grant authorized to make any military
decision on the spot, and if necessary, assume command of the Division of the South. Violence
did erupt on January 4, 1875 and Sheridan quickly moved to end it. The Democrats, no doubt
with the support of the White League, seized the state House and occupied the five seats.
Sheridan dispatched Major General William H. Emory to clear the House chamber of all persons
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who did not have an election certificate. All five Democrats were removed and the Republicans
took the House and elected a speaker.265
While the party supported Grant’s and Sheridan’s action, the President still reassured the
Senate he held no desire to use troops in the South. Yet, the people of the South left him no
choice as he extended them peace, and he was not going to tolerate continued violence as
Congress vested him with the proper powers to crush insurrections. Grant argued that federal
intervention was necessary as “the spirit of hatred and violence is stronger than law.”266 Here
Grant evoked the Athenian historian Thucydides as he debated that the passions of the people of
Louisiana compel them to believe they are above the law. On revolutionary passions, Thucydides
argues “In peace and prosperity states and individuals have better sentiments, because they do
not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war takes away the easy
supply of daily wants and so proves a rough master that brings most men’s characters to a level
with their fortunes.”267 As Thucydides argues, war brings about revolutionary passions in the
individual as it is in human nature too rebel from the law, but the law prevents the worst of evils
from occurring.268 Grant believed, it was his duty as president to protect black rights and uphold
the law.
In his message, Grant referred back to laws passed by Congress that enabled him to act in
such a matter.269 And for Grant, the use of federal troops worked as “Both parties appear[ed] to
have relied upon them as conservators of the public peace.”270 Despite the use of force, Grant
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echoed Lincoln as he maintained his dislike of force in Louisiana and other parts of the South, as
he “repeatedly and earnestly entreated the people of the South to live together in peace, and obey
the laws; and nothing would give [Grant] greater pleasure than to see reconciliation and
tranquility everywhere prevail, and thereby remove all necessity for the presence of troops
among them.”271 But Grant understood, this was not the case as violence against white supporters
of the Republican Party, and blacks overall, ran rampant. In this speech, Grant not only argues
using the law to defend his actions, but offers peace, and if the people of the South continue to
resist such offers, federal intervention will continue. Like Lincoln, Grant placed peace in the
hands of the South. However, unlike Lincoln, Grant was willing to use the military to enforce the
law, not in a time of great rebellion, but in a time where peace was supposed to exist. More
importantly, his rhetoric shows Grant accepted blacks as citizens as he offered protection to them
against the Ku Klux Klan and the White League.
Republican resolve began to wane and many Republicans began to oppose further
intervention in the South. After the election of 1872, many Northern voters also gave up on black
civil rights. While Grant was reelected, the Northern public showed less interest in protecting
civil rights in the South. Despite a strong support for the Radicals, Northern commitment for
black rights was never really deep, especially as emancipation and black suffrage were byproducts of the Union victory over the Confederacy. They reflected Union policy, and as the war
ended and receded into reconciliation between the two sections, support for blacks diminished.
Moreover, Republicans showed discontent with the party’s overall Reconstruction policy as
many members opposed federal regulation of Southern elections through the Enforcement Acts,
and wanted military rule to end. Additionally, corruption scandals in Grant’s Cabinet, although
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not linked directly to him, further weakened Northern support for the Administration’s policies
on Reconstruction. With three amendments and major civil rights legislation in place, many
Republicans began felt satisfied with the gains made and began to focus on economic issue
spurred on by the Panic of 1873. Grant stood alone. His cabinet was uninterested and faced
corruption scandals, the Supreme Court gutted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and
the public was ready for reconciliation.272
There is irony in the manner in which Reconstruction came to an end. Grant had a firm
belief that reconciliation was the best approach concerning secession and the war, and he held on
to this belief throughout Reconstruction. But after nearly a decade of civil unrest, the nation was
ready to embrace reconciliation, move on to more pressing issues, and all but abandoned civil
rights for black Americans. Grant, was not willing to accept this. As the South refused to accept
Northern policies, Grant was forced to respond as general and as president. As a soldier, Grant
placed his morals in upholding the Constitution, particularly as the South seceded from the
country. As the Civil War quickly evolved into one from Union first to emancipation, Grant
accepted this as a policy that was intertwined with military affairs. Not only did he display a
form of compassion for runaway slaves and his black soldiers as the war progressed, he did his
best to safeguard the liberties of freedmen. He did so in a manner that evoked moderation in
policy and prevented a social revolution. He took an active role in policy making as he accepted
the achievements made by the Union after the war were threatened by Johnson and by
obstruction in the South. His policy of enforcement was one based on the unfolding of event and
it certainly expanded the powers of the executive. His use of the military to intervene in regions
where the function of state courts was questionable is a drastic interpretation of the Constitution

Smith, Grant, 568, 571.; Richard Abbott, “Reconstruction Winds Down: The Grant Years,” in Major
Problems in the Civil War and Reconstruction, ed. Michael Perman (Boston, 1998), 413.
272

134
as this was done during peacetime. Still, Grant’s interventions were needed in order to uphold
the Union war gains. Ultimately, the liberties of both freedmen and Southerners were completely
ignored as both sides struggled to uphold different understandings of the term equality.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The Presidential Election of 1876 was riddled with electoral controversy and Republican
candidate Rutherford B. Hayes was awarded the presidency with the agreement to remove all
federal troops from the South, an agreement enacted by the Democrats. After his inauguration,
Hayes removed all federal soldiers and Southern Redeemers gained full control of Southern
legislatures.273 Grant surely understood the task of Reconstruction remained incomplete as he left
office. Since the firing on Fort Sumter, bringing the eleven seceded states back into the Union
proved to be a difficult task as slavery and black suffrage were the core causes of Southern
resistance. But for Grant and the rest of the North, the Union was secure as secession was dead,
with slavery dead.
Still with the Republican retreat from the South, redeemers began to implement “home
rule” at the expense of free blacks. When the Republicans were at the height of their power,
blacks were able to enjoy their political rights, and the federal government was willing to accept
the responsibility of protecting their fundamental rights. True, the election of Hayes did not bring
a sudden rush of Southern Redeemers back into their state houses, but in the final decades of the
nineteenth century, Redeemers put into place new systems of economic, political, and social
relations. This was the start of a systematic effort to disenfranchise black Americans that lasted
until the mid-twentieth century. Even though legislation such as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were written forever into the Constitutions, Southerners did their best to legally
dismantle them, and the Northern public and politicians, allowed them to do so. Black

Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, 525, 555.; James McPherson,
“Abolitionists and the Civil Rights Act of 1875,” The Jounral of American History 52, no. 3 (1965), 493, 496, 498,
accessed February 12, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1890844.; Scaturro, President Grant Reconsidered, 94.
273

136
participation in American politics did not cease with redemption, but the policies of the
Redeemer governments shaped Southern class relations, economic development, and, as has
already been discussed, historical memory on the Civil War and Reconstruction.274
After leaving office in 1877, Grant embarked on a world tour that took the President and
his party, including Julia, his youngest son, New York Herald reporter, John Russell Young, and
several friends, from Europe to Asia, and finally, the Middle East. The trip lasted two-and-a-half
years, and being so far from home Grant felt free to candidly discuss the war, Union and
Confederate officer, and Reconstruction politics with Young.275 It is during this tour, that Grant
discussed Reconstruction at length, more so than he did in his Personal Memoirs. In addition,
through these interviews, Grant discussed politics at a high level as he assessed the failures of
Reconstruction. His interviews with Young have been used throughout this paper, and cover a
variety of topics, but the most fascinating interview topics Grant participated in are those on
European colonization, and the cause of the Civil War with German Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck, with whom Grant was taken.
After Grant made his way to Bismarck’s palace on foot, and not in a vast, thundering
coach expected of a former President of the United States, the two men sat down and began their
discussion. Bismarck began by inquiring after General Philip Sheridan, who served as an
American observer during the Franco-Prussian War, but the discussion then shifted to the
American Civil War. Bismarck commented that the war was a sad one, as the Americans were
fighting each other, and the Chancellor noted that level is warfare is terrible, especially as the
United States generally did not have to fear wars.276 With precision, Grant responded that the
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war was a necessary one, to which Bismarck argued the Union needed to be saved just as
Germany needed to be saved. With this answer, Bismarck viewed the Civil War as one with one
outcome: to keep the Union together, just as his goal was to unite Germany. Grant’s response
shows how far he had come in his thinking of the war and Reconstruction. In his usual manner,
he simply, but powerfully, responded that the war was, “Not only [to] save the Union, but
destroy slavery.”277 Bismarck could not understand that the war was for anything but the Union,
as he maintained that was the dominant sentiment. Finally, Grant gave the Chancellor a response
that shows he was no longer the man who fought for Union first: “as soon as slavery fired upon
the flag it was felt, we all felt, even those who did not object to slaves, that slavery must be
destroyed. We felt that it was a stain to the Union that men should be bought and sold like
cattle.”278 Grant continued to argue that slavery needed to end as it would be the constant cause
of future rebellions. Grant, with firm conviction, debated with Bismarck: “There had to be an end
to slavery. Then we were fighting an enemy whom we could not make peace. We had to destroy
him. No convention, no treaty was possible--only destruction.”279
While Grant was confident the war evolved from the cause of saving the Union only to
saving the Union and ending slavery, he viewed aspects of Reconstruction as a failure. As noted,
he favored military rule as the best policy to reconstruct the South as it allowed for the
enforcement of black suffrage. Although Southerners worked to disfranchise black voters, Grant
believed that black civil rights cannot be taken away, and it is the duty of the country to protect
those who face intimidation and violence for simply exercising their rights. While guaranteeing
and protecting black suffrage brought on violence in this South, Grant could not envision a
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scenario in which such rights were taken away as he argued to Young, “Whether it was wise or
unwise to have given the negro suffrage, we have done so, and no one can look on satisfied and
see it taken from him.”280 In his Personal Memoirs, Grant writes of the annexation of the island
of Santo Domingo as a state of the Union for blacks as he believed doing so might have eased
racial tensions in the country. Grant was not alone in this sentiment as the settlement of slaves in
Africa was popular at the beginning of the nineteenth-century, but Grant was not fully committed
to this idea, as he reasoned that black individuals were “brought to our shores by compulsion,
and [they] now should be considered as having as good a right to remain here as any other class
of our citizens.”281 As Grant confesses, he did not believe in Lincoln’s belief that the country
could not exist half slave and half free.282
For Grant, the Civil War began with cause centered on fighting for Union first. But as the
war took its course, it quickly became evident to all parties involved that the issue of slavery
could not be ignored. Grant demonstrated that was able and willing to incorporate federal policy
on slavery into his military policy, believing it yielded the best results. But perhaps, his time
during Reconstruction changed Grant’s thinking on civil rights for black Americans. He
supported legislation on the issue, and used the powers vested in him as the Executive to protect
blacks as citizens of the United States. Grant admitted Reconstruction may have been a failure,
but he was not willing to concede enfranchisement had been a failure. In his memoirs he upheld
his belief in a speedy reconstruction that would lead to peace without humiliating the South, but
admitted he had “gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, I
favored immediate enfranchisement.”283 Reconstruction represented a vital shift in American
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history as the antebellum social structure was completely undone and a new structure was
created. It is within this social construction that early writers of Reconstruction developed their
arguments on the era and its participants, including Grant. Not only did many of these writers
and scholars write on Reconstruction with racial and political biases, but their arguments
permeated into American decades later.
Because Grant is difficult to understand and already suffered from a damaged reputation
due to the manner in which his presidency ended, scholars in modern times write of him with the
old, outdated arguments in mind. Yet, when studying Grant, extensive analysis is required as the
man is difficult to understand, and thus represents a mystery. Best put, Grant was a silent man.
This may be a simple summarization of the man, but it a powerful characterization because
accepting this is the first step in attempting to understand him. Grant did not share his feelings
through vast volumes of letters and speeches like presidents before and after him. When he did
share his thoughts, he did so in a manner that was concise and to the point. This leaves historians
wanting more from him, or as John Russell Young explained, “One wishes that he might gather
up and bind [the] sheaves of history.”284 Whether Reconstruction failed is not the argument of
this paper. However, understanding Grant’s policies and principles during Reconstruction is
beneficial. If he is accepted as he is and removed from the social construction created by the Lost
Cause and the Dunning School, then further scholarship can be added to the field that helps in
understanding Grant’s development on emancipation and civil rights.
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